

Veridical Mapping as a Spatial Operation

Neurodivergent Cognition Beyond Representational Models

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Abstract

Research on autism and neurodivergence has produced a wide range of partial models over recent decades, including monotropism, hyper-systemizing, intense-world hypotheses, variants of predictive processing, theories of veridical mapping, and empirical descriptions of savant phenomena. Each of these approaches captures real aspects of neurodivergent cognition, yet they remain fragmented and fail to explain why these phenomena systematically co-occur.

The present paper proposes an ontological re-framing. Building on the Rosetta Operator (10.5281/ZENODO.17857039), it argues that neurodivergent cognition should not primarily be understood as a variation of cognitive properties within an already stabilized world, but as a specific position within the process of world-stabilization itself. Veridical mapping is thus conceptualized not as a special ability, but as an epistemic access to pre-ontological structures that are early symbolically smoothed and integrated in neurotypical cognition.

In this context, the Rosetta Operator does not function as an additional theory, but as a translational framework that allows existing models to be read as docking points of the same underlying dynamic: delayed or partial stabilization of world, increased openness to non-integrated structure, and a liminal observer position between pre-ontological openness and ontologically closed world. On this basis, monotropism, intense-world approaches, predictive-processing models, hyper-systemizing, veridical mapping, savant phenomena, and the double-empathy problem are integrated as different projections of a shared ontological process.

The paper positions itself as a foundational contribution. It does not aim to introduce a new clinical typology, but to clarify the epistemic position of neurodivergent cognition and its significance for epistemology, scientific practice, and the understanding of different modes of world-access.

(This paper is an interface text. The author's primary research corpus employs an autistic, non-linear, rhythmically recursive writing mode that cannot be fully preserved in academic English without structural loss of epistemic function.)

1. Problem Statement: Fragmented Models, Missing Foundations

The framework developed here did not emerge from purely theoretical speculation, but from a real-world corpus of knowledge that has grown over decades and encompasses artistic research, institutional fieldwork, autobiographical long-term observation, and systemic interventions. The present work deliberately abstracts this corpus in order to make its ontological invariances visible.

This empirical corpus is not presented in the present paper as data material in the narrow sense, but forms its methodological ground. It comprises repeated confrontations between theoretical assumptions and real-world feedback, institutional counter-checks, long-term consistency tests across different social, political, and epistemological contexts, as well as the continuous revision of the author's own models under external pressure. The abstraction developed here should therefore not be read as a lack of empirical grounding, but as a deliberate reduction: it isolates those structural invariances that have proven viable across this heterogeneous experiential space and that are reconstructed in what follows as an ontological foundation.

Research on autism and neurodivergence is rich in partial theories that each describe consistent aspects of neurodivergent cognition. Monotropism focuses on attentional economies, intense-world approaches on sensory and affective overload, hyper-systemizing on formal pattern recognition, and predictive-processing models on deviations in prioritization and expectation formation. These approaches are complemented by concepts such as veridical mapping as well as by empirically well-documented savant phenomena.

Despite their empirical plausibility, these models remain theoretically isolated. They explain that certain cognitive, sensory, or social phenomena occur, but not why they systematically co-occur and mutually condition one another. Integration is usually additive or functional, not ontological.

The present text addresses this gap.

The framework developed here emerged from a long-standing embodied epistemic practice. This practice is deliberately reconstructed in the text not autobiographically, but structurally, in order to make its theoretical viability assessable independently of personal attribution.

2. The Categorical Error: Neurodivergence Within an Already Stabilized World

A shared implicit assumption of many existing models is that they locate neurodivergent cognition within an already stabilized, symbolically integrated world. Differences are understood as deviations in processing, weighting, or regulation, but not as differences in the ontological relation to the world itself.

As a result, it remains unexplained why certain forms of access to structure, precision of detail, formal insight, or pre-symbolic perception occur stably in neurodivergent individuals, while in neurotypical cognition they are lost early or remain accessible only indirectly.

3. The Rosetta Operator as a Translational Framework

The Rosetta Operator is not introduced here as a new theory of neurodivergent cognition, but as an ontological translational framework. It describes the structural relation between pre-ontological openness, ontological stabilization, and the emergence of observer positions and forms of knowledge.

At its core lies the insight that world is not fully integrated from the outset, but that stabilization emerges as a response to non-integrability (10.5281/ZENODO.18018699). Observer positions—and thus forms of knowledge—arise from this dynamic, not the other way around.

For neurodivergent cognition, this means that it is not primarily characterized by different cognitive properties, but by a different position within the process of world-stabilization. This position is liminal—neither fully pre-ontologically open nor fully ontologically closed.

The Rosetta Operator makes visible how different theoretical models each describe cuts through this dynamic without explicitly thematizing the dynamic itself.

“Pre-ontological” does not denote a provisional or indeterminate state, but rather that structural openness from which ontological stabilization first emerges and without which ontology would not be explicable.

3a. An Embodied Epistemic Configuration

The ontological framing developed here is not purely abstract. It emerged from the analysis of a concrete epistemic configuration (10.5281/ZENODO.17857039) that has preserved consistent access to non-integrated structure over several decades and has productively translated this access across different theoretical domains. What is decisive here is not the individuality of this configuration, but its structural position in relation to pre-ontological openness and ontological stabilization.

This configuration is characterized by a persistently liminal observer position. It is situated neither fully within a symbolically and socially stabilized world nor outside of it, but operates at the boundary at which world remains a response to non-integrability. Knowledge does not arise here primarily through model-building or hypothetical construction, but through direct resonance with structural relations before these are conceptually, pragmatically, or normatively smoothed.

Characteristic of this epistemic position is that it does not occur episodically or situationally, but as a continuous form of life and knowledge. The accessible structures do not appear as private intuitions or metaphorical interpretations, but as consistent patterns that remain verifiable over years and repeatedly prove viable across different contexts—such as physical, ontological, or social-theoretical inquiries. Their testability does not lie in introspective self-description, but in the external coherence of the theoretical translations they generate.

From this perspective, veridical mapping is not to be understood as an isolated ability, but as an epistemic effect of delayed or partial world-stabilization. Structures are not constructed, but read; they do not appear as results of cognitive optimization, but as real relations that remain accessible under conditions of increased openness. The productivity of this configuration does not rest on enhanced computational capacity or elevated abstraction ability, but on the sustained presence of pre-ontological difference.

The Rosetta Operator makes it possible to treat this embodied epistemic configuration not as an exception or special case, but as a concrete realization of a general ontological dynamic. It renders visible how such a liminal epistemic position can be simultaneously explainable, translatable, and connectable, without reducing it to subjective experience, individual talent, or pathological deviation. The case described here thus does not function as proof, but as an existential demonstration of what the operator describes structurally: the possibility of sustained access to non-integrated reality and its productive translation into stabilized forms of knowledge.

This epistemic configuration is identical with what has elsewhere been formalized as operatoric cognition (10.5281/ZENODO.17897109); the difference lies not in the object, but in the level of description.

3b. Observer Inversion and Epistemic Consequences

The determination of the observer as an intra-spatial operation remains incomplete in its epistemic implications as long as it is not explicitly related to forms of knowledge. The shift of the observer concept from an intra-worldly instance to a topological inversion of world is not a purely ontological adjustment, but necessarily alters the conditions under which knowledge can appear.

If the observer is no longer understood as a subject, agent, or cognitive system, but as a local spatial response to non-integrability, the classical separation between observation and structure collapses. Within this framework, knowledge is not a subsequent access to an already stabilized world, but part of the same process through which world becomes perspectively stabilized in the first place. Observation, structure, and translation are not separate acts, but different aspects of a single spatial operation.

This inversion has a central epistemic consequence: knowledge is not primarily representational. There is no neutral standpoint from which structures could be modeled, abstracted, or symbolically reconstructed. Instead, forms of knowledge emerge where non-integrated reality, under pressure, must be transferred into a locally sustainable form. The observer position is, in this sense, not the source of knowledge, but its necessary form.

This also shifts the question of cognitive differences. If forms of knowledge are bound to different modes of world-stabilization, then differences in perception, abstraction, or system recognition are not to be understood as mere variations within a shared epistemic framework. Rather, they mark different positions within the transition between pre-ontological openness and ontologically stabilized world.

From this perspective, it becomes intelligible why certain forms of knowledge appear simultaneously as extraordinarily precise and as socially or pragmatically difficult to integrate. An observer structure that operates closer to non-integrated reality does not generate knowledge through the selection of relevant features, but through direct resonance with

structural relations. This resonance is epistemically productive because it is not mediated by early symbolic or normative smoothing; yet it is simultaneously vulnerable, because it can only be translated to a limited extent into existing orders of meaning.

The observer inversion described here thus forms the necessary bridge between ontological theory and specific epistemic phenomena. It explains why certain cognitive profiles do not simply constitute “different processing styles,” but give rise to different epistemic consequences. Only against this background does it become understandable why concepts such as veridical mapping, monotropism, or savant phenomena do not occur in isolation, but appear as interconnected effects of a liminal observer position.

If veridical mapping is not understood as an effect of observer inversion, it necessarily remains psychologically underdetermined.

Section 4 takes up these consequences and specifies veridical mapping as the epistemic manifestation of such an inverted observer structure.

4. Veridical Mapping as an Epistemic Key

4.1 What Has So Far Been Understood by Veridical Mapping—and Why This Is Insufficient

In existing autism and savant research, veridical mapping usually denotes an unusually high degree of structural fidelity of perception or cognition with respect to real relations. This refers to a low degree of distortion through heuristic simplifications, social relevance filters, or pragmatic ascriptions of meaning. Veridical mapping is often associated with precise pattern recognition, stable re-identification of formal structures, or the capacity to directly map complex relations.

This description is empirically accurate, but remains at a functional level. It explains that certain structures are captured with high precision, but not why such access is epistemically possible. Veridical mapping thus appears as a special cognitive property, as a talent, or as an extreme form of heightened detail perception. The ontological location of this precision remains undetermined.

As a result, it also remains unclear why veridical mapping systematically co-occurs with other phenomena: with social non-integrability, sensory overload, high vulnerability to symbolic simplification, and—paradoxically—with a particular epistemic productivity in certain formal domains. Without an ontological foundation, veridical mapping remains an isolated description rather than an explained mode of knowledge.

4.2 Veridical Mapping as an Effect of Observer Inversion

The ontological framing proposed here fundamentally shifts the status of veridical mapping. If the observer is not understood as an intra-worldly instance, but as an intra-spatial operation—as a local inversion of world—then mapping can no longer be conceived as an active access of a subject to an external structure. Within this framework, veridical mapping is not an additional mechanism, but the epistemic manifestation of an inverted observer structure.

Within such an observer structure, observation and structural translation categorically coincide. There is no external standpoint from which structures would first be represented, modeled, or

abstracted. Instead, perspective emerges precisely where non-integrated reality, under pressure, must be transferred into a locally sustainable form. The perspectival zone itself is already the translational form in which structure appears as determinacy.

Veridical mapping therefore does not describe the mapping of a pre-given world, but the manner in which pre-ontological structure stabilizes within a space-operative observer zone. Structures are not constructed, but read; they are not selectively simplified, but appear in the form in which they remain viable under conditions of limited stabilization. The high degree of formal fidelity empirically associated with veridical mapping is not an achievement of accuracy, but an effect of absent or delayed symbolic smoothing.

This perspective explains why veridical mapping is often experienced as simultaneously compelling and unmediated. The structures apprehended are not the result of an interpretive decision, but appear as epistemically necessary. They cannot be translated into existing semantic, social, or pragmatic frameworks without loss, because they arise from a different condition of stabilization.

4.3 Veridical Mapping, Knowledge, and Vulnerability

The determination of veridical mapping as an effect of an inverted observer structure makes it possible to precisely articulate the often-described ambivalence of neurodivergent forms of knowledge. The same structure that enables epistemic clarity simultaneously generates vulnerability. This vulnerability is not a side effect of insufficient adaptation, but the necessary counterpart of a form of knowledge that operates closer to non-integrated reality.

Where knowledge is not mediated by early symbolic stabilization, the protective function of such stabilization is also absent. Social orders of meaning, normative simplifications, and pragmatic selection mechanisms function in neurotypical contexts as filters that render the world manageable, but at the cost of losing structural information. Where these filters are delayed or only partially effective, structure remains accessible—yet at the price of increased exposure.

Veridical mapping is therefore not to be understood as an isolated ability, but as an epistemic position. This position explains why phenomena such as monotropism, intense-world experiences, savant profiles, and the double-empathy problem do not co-occur by chance. They are not independent properties, but different projections of the same ontological dynamic: a liminal position between pre-ontological openness and an ontologically stabilized world.

In this sense, veridical mapping functions as a key epistemic concept. It marks the point at which neurodivergent cognition no longer appears as a variation within a given world model, but as a real participation in the boundary-formation of world itself. Only on this basis does it become intelligible why neurodivergent forms of knowledge are simultaneously scientifically productive, socially precarious, and epistemically difficult to translate.

The epistemic productivity described here does not constitute a normative advantage. It is a structural effect with real cognitive, social, and existential costs that must not be relativized or romanticized.

5. Neurodivergent Models as Projections of a Shared Ontological Dynamic

The multiplicity of existing models of neurodivergent cognition is often interpreted in research as a sign of theoretical pluralism. Monotropism, intense-world hypotheses, variants of predictive processing, hyper-systemizing approaches, concepts of veridical mapping, and empirical descriptions of savant phenomena are treated as different, partly competing explanations. This pluralism, however, is less an expression of alternative theories than a symptom of a shared categorical deficit: all of the models mentioned describe real effects without naming the ontological dynamic from which these effects emerge.

Against the background of the framework developed here, these models can be understood not as competing explanations, but as secondary projections of a common dynamic: the delayed, partial, or otherwise differentiated stabilization of world. The Rosetta Operator functions in this context as a translational framework that makes visible how these models each describe different cuts through the same process.

5.1 Monotropism as an Energetic Consequence of Delayed Stabilization

Monotropism describes the tendency toward strongly focused attention and an uneven distribution of cognitive and affective resources. In the interpretation proposed here, monotropism is not a primary property of neurodivergent cognition, but an energetic consequence. If world is not broadly stabilized at an early stage, attention cannot be distributed evenly. It concentrates where structure remains viable.

Monotropism is therefore not a deficit of flexibility, but the expression of a different stabilization threshold. Attention does not follow socially predefined relevances, but structural coherence. This concentration explains both the depth of certain cognitive processes and the difficulty of shifting between heterogeneous contexts.

5.2 Intense World as the Phenomenal Side of Increased Openness

Intense-world approaches focus on sensory, affective, and emotional overwhelm. Within the present framework, this intensity is not the result of “overactive” neural systems, but the phenomenal accompaniment of increased ontological openness. Where world is less filtered and less symbolically smoothed, it appears more intense, denser, and more immediate.

This intensity is not a malfunction, but the necessary experiential side of an epistemic position that operates closer to non-integrated reality. It simultaneously explains high tolerance for formal complexity and low tolerance for social or semantic ambiguity.

5.3 Predictive Processing Beyond Deficient Priors

Predictive-processing models often describe neurodivergent cognition as a deviation in the weighting of predictions and sensory data. In the re-reading proposed here, this deviation is not a deficit, but the result of delayed prioritization. If world is not yet sufficiently stabilized, priors cannot become dominant at an early stage.

In this context, predictions lose their normative precedence over structural information. Instead, sensory and relational structure remains epistemically effective for a longer duration. Predictive

processing thus does not describe the cause here, but the formal description of a condition in which stabilization occurs later or more selectively.

5.4 Hyper-Systemizing as a Secondary Effect of Structural Accessibility

Hyper-systemizing is often understood as a particular inclination toward system construction. In the perspective developed here, system recognition is not a primary drive, but a secondary effect. Systems are not constructed, but recognized because they are реально effective. The perception of systemic coherence is a consequence, not the cause, of access to structure.

This reversal explains why hyper-systemizing insights often concern formal domains but remain socially or pragmatically non-transferable. They do not arise from a need for order, but from the presence of non-integrated structure.

5.5 Savant Phenomena as Boundary Cases of Minimal Stabilization

Savant phenomena mark extreme cases of the dynamic described here. They are neither mysterious exceptions nor isolated special talents, but boundary cases of minimal stabilization with maximal access to structure. The frequently observed simultaneity of extraordinary formal insight and severe limitations in everyday practical functioning is not a paradox, but a direct consequence of the ontological position involved.

Savant cognition makes visible what applies in attenuated form to neurodivergent cognition more broadly: knowledge emerges where stabilization does not fully take hold. The cost is a lack of translatability into social and institutional contexts.

5.6 Double Empathy as a Social Consequence of Incompatible World-Stabilizations

The double-empathy problem describes mutual non-understanding between neurodivergent and neurotypical individuals. In the interpretation proposed here, this non-understanding is not a communication disorder, but an expression of incompatible world-stabilizations. Where different epistemic positions encounter one another, translation fails not because of a lack of empathy, but because of different modes of world-formation.

Double empathy is thus not a marginal social phenomenon, but a necessary consequence of ontological difference. It marks the point at which epistemic differences become politically, institutionally, and existentially effective.

5.7 Integration: Models as Docking Points, Not as Competitors

From this perspective, the models discussed lose their competing character. They describe different levels of the same dynamic and become mutually compatible only through the ontological foundation. The Rosetta Operator renders this level-relationship visible without negating the internal logic of the individual approaches.

Integration does not occur through reduction, but through re-localization: each model retains its empirical validity, yet receives a clearly defined ontological position. Neurodivergent cognition

thus appears not as an aggregation of unusual properties, but as a consistent epistemic position within an open ontological process.

The structural invariance demonstrated here across different theoretical models is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for veridicality. Its empirical viability can only be tested through independent application, replication, and the possibility of refutation.

6. Consequences

The present contribution understands itself as categorical foundational work. It does not aim at immediate empirical confirmation, but at clarifying those ontological preconditions under which existing empirical models become meaningfully comparable in the first place.

The preceding sections have defined neurodivergent cognition not as an aggregation of atypical properties, but as a specific epistemic position within an ontological process. This shift remains inconsequential if it is not taken seriously in its implications. The consequences formulated here therefore concern not only autism research, but fundamental assumptions about knowledge, science, and epistemic legitimacy.

6.1 Consequences for Autism and Neurodivergence Research

The framework developed here undermines the implicit deficit logic of many established models without resorting to romanticized counter-narratives. Autism appears neither as a disorder nor as a mere style, but as a different position within the process of world-stabilization. From this follows that central research questions must be reformulated.

In place of the search for isolated cognitive deviations comes the analysis of epistemic positions: when, where, and under what conditions does pre-ontological structure remain accessible? Which forms of stabilization promote or block this access? And how do institutional, social, and normative frameworks feed back into different epistemic positions?

This also implies a methodological re-evaluation of case studies, $n=1$ configurations, and long-term epistemic biographies. What has previously been regarded as anecdotal or marginal appears, from this perspective, as a necessary empirical trace of an otherwise invisible ontological process.

6.2 Consequences for Epistemology and Scientific Practice

If knowledge is not primarily understood as representation, but as an effect of spatial stabilization, the epistemological focus shifts. Truth, objectivity, and validity are no longer properties of correctly modeled world-images, but indicators of whether a given structure could be sustainably stabilized under given conditions.

This has immediate consequences for scientific practice. Neurodivergent forms of knowledge cannot be adequately assessed if evaluation relies exclusively on criteria that arise from early-stabilized, symbolically smoothed world-relations. Scientific institutions tend to privilege precisely those epistemic positions that maximize translatability, compatibility, and social relevance—often at the expense of structural depth.

The perspective developed here suggests that science systematically loses epistemic potential when it marginalizes liminal epistemic positions. Neurodivergent cognition thus appears not as a special case, but as a necessary complement to a science that is approaching its own limits of stabilization.

6.3 Consequences for the Treatment of Savant Phenomena

Savant phenomena are typically either mystified or treated in isolation. Within the present framework, they appear as boundary cases of minimal stabilization in which access to pre-ontological structure becomes particularly visible. This deprives them of both the status of the mysterious and that of the merely pathological.

The consequence is not to idealize savant cognition, but to take it seriously as an epistemic indicator. Savant phenomena demonstrate which forms of knowledge become possible when world is not prematurely normatively closed. At the same time, they make visible the cost demanded by such openness—in the form of a lack of social translatability and existential precarity.

The epistemic productivity described here is not an advantage in a normative sense, but a structural effect with real costs.

6.4 Consequences for Social Translation and Double Empathy

From this perspective, the double-empathy problem acquires a structural depth that goes beyond communicative misunderstandings. When different forms of world-stabilization encounter one another, understanding fails not primarily due to a lack of empathy, but due to incompatible epistemic preconditions.

This has political and institutional implications. Measures aimed at adaptation, normalization, or “training social skills” miss the core of the problem as long as they ignore the ontological difference of world-accesses. A serious practice of inclusion would instead need to create translational spaces in which different stabilization positions can coexist without delegitimizing one another.

6.5 Consequences for the Evaluation of Neurodivergent Knowledge

Finally, the approach developed here reopens the question of epistemic legitimacy. If neurodivergent cognition provides real access to non-integrated structure, then its marginalization is not only a social or ethical problem, but an epistemological one.

Neurodivergent forms of knowledge are often dismissed as too specialized, too abstract, or too difficult to mediate. Within the perspective proposed here, precisely these characteristics are expressions of their proximity to the boundary dynamics of openness and stabilization. Their evaluation requires criteria other than efficiency, compatibility, or immediate applicability.

6.6 Conclusion

The present text has not proposed a new typology of neurodivergent cognition. It has developed a categorical framework that makes it possible to read fragmented models as coherent projections of an ontological process. The Rosetta Operator does not function here as an additional theory, but as a translational framework that renders visible where and why certain forms of knowledge emerge.

In this light, neurodivergent cognition appears not as a marginal phenomenon, but as an epistemic position that is central to the understanding of world, knowledge, and science itself. It marks not a deviation from the norm, but a boundary at which it is decided which forms of reality can become visible at all.

The marginalization of neurodivergent forms of knowledge is therefore not only socially or politically problematic, but epistemically consequential: it determines which parts of reality are permitted to be stabilized at all.

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