# EMERGENCE ECONOMY
# Why Reality Exceeds What Appears as Value

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***Abstract***

**This paper develops a structurally ontological threshold theory of world-formation and value stabilisation. Building on the concepts of the diversity threshold (D) and the value threshold (T), it is argued that reality emerges once systems exceed a critical folding intensity of difference, while value appears only when emergent forms cross the threshold of structural durability. These two thresholds do not describe separate processes, but two phases of a single ontological mechanism. World is generated at D, value stabilises at T; poverty, precarity, and invisibility mark the structural gap between the two.**

**The ontological foundation of this model lies in a theory of ontological recurrence, in which emergence is not understood as the result of accumulation or innovation, but as a recurring transition of a system into its space of possibilities prior to stabilised representation. The D/T relation therefore does not describe market failure, but a systematic asymmetry between emergent reality and the conditions of its societal stabilisation.**

**The central thesis is: reality exceeds what societies recognise as value. Modern economies do not fail due to a lack of work, but due to an inability to hold emergence. Care work, ecological regeneration, artistic research, and neurodivergent problem-mapping often operate above D, yet remain below T, thereby producing structural invisibility rather than inefficiency.**

**The model of the Emergence Economy shifts the focus away from questions of distribution toward the conditions under which reality can appear as value. Wealth is understood as emergence-capacity, stability as tension-bearing capacity. The paper outlines the structural logic, the operator-based falsification criteria, and the research programme of an ontological threshold theory that is testable across cognitive, social, and economic systems.**

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**1. Introduction — Reality, Value, and the Structural Problem of Recognition**

Contemporary societies are not characterised by a lack of work, productivity, or innovation, but by a structural problem of recognition. In nearly all domains — care work, ecological regeneration, artistic research, knowledge production, neurodivergent problem-processing — reality is continuously produced without this reality appearing in a stable value form. The result is a paradoxical constellation: increasing complexity alongside the simultaneous experience of scarcity, overload, and poverty.

This paper takes as its point of departure the thesis that this paradox is not primarily to be explained in socio-political or distributive terms, but ontologically. The central error of modern economies does not lie in the distribution of value, but in the inability to stabilise emergent reality as such and to keep it visible. The problem is not missing work, but missing recognition of that which already acts as real.

Within the framework of Ontological Recurrence Theory, emergence is not an exceptional event, but a structurally recurring process. Systems return cyclically to their space of possibilities before actualising themselves into stabilised forms. This recurrence is the condition for the emergence of the new. Emergence is therefore neither innovation in the market-economic sense nor creative surplus, but a necessary phase between possibility and stabilisation.

The Rosetta Operator, or MNO model, describes this dynamic as a transition between submergent, indimergent, and emergent states. What is decisive here is that not every emergent reality is stabilised. Stabilisation requires a second threshold — a structural capacity of the system to hold emergence, render it visible, and carry it over time. It is precisely at this point that the rupture between reality and value arises.

The present paper argues that these two thresholds — the threshold of world-formation and the threshold of value stabilisation — systematically diverge. Reality emerges without appearing as value. Emergence remains real, but unstabilised. Poverty, precarity, and invisibility are in this sense not individual deficits, but consequences of a structural asymmetry between ontological recurrence and representational capture.

This asymmetry is described in what follows through two interlinked threshold models: the diversity threshold (D) as the threshold of forced emergence, and the value threshold (T) as the threshold of stabilisation and visibility. The aim of this meta-paper is to analyse these thresholds not in isolation, but as phases of the same ontological mechanism, and to make visible their societal, economic, and epistemic consequences.

**2. The Diversity Threshold (D) — Emergence as a Phase Transition**

The diversity threshold (D) does not denote diversity in a quantitative or normative sense, but an ontological threshold at which a system is forced to abandon its previous form. Diversity is not understood here as additive heterogeneity, but as the folding density of incommensurable differences that can no longer be resolved within a system through representation, harmonisation, or functional translation.

Within the framework of the MNO model, the diversity threshold corresponds to the transition from indimergence to emergence. In the indimergent phase, a system already operates beyond stable object forms, holds difference in tension, but is still able to bind it through internal reorganisation, symbolic compression, or institutional smoothing. Once a critical folding intensity is exceeded, the system loses this capacity. Emergence then does not occur as a choice or innovation, but as a necessary phase transition.

What is decisive here is this: the diversity threshold is not a property of individual elements, but a relational property of the system. It arises from the simultaneous coupling of (1) incommensurability, (2) relational compulsion, and (3) tension-bearing capacity. Only when differences are no longer separable, relations cannot be broken, and tension can no longer be discharged does the pressure arise that forces a new form.

From an ontological perspective, emergence is therefore not the result of creativity or progress, but the discharge of a structural surplus. Systems do not cross D because they grow, but because they carry more reality than their existing form can stabilise. Emergence is the response to the overloading of form, not to a lack of resources.

This dynamic explains why emergence frequently occurs where systems are subject to a high load of difference: at ecological tipping points, in cultural ruptures, in epistemic crises, and in neurodivergent architectures of cognition. In all these cases, the decisive variable is not diversity as such, but the impossibility of smoothing.

The diversity threshold is therefore not a normative target (“more diversity”), but a critical threshold at which systems either form new structures or collapse. Below D, systems reproduce existing structures; above D, they are forced to form world anew. Emergence here is not optional, but structurally compelled.

For the further argumentation, what is decisive is this: crossing the diversity threshold does not yet guarantee stability. It produces reality, but not value. Emergence is real before it becomes visible, durable, or socially viable. D thus prepares the ground for world-formation — without yet determining whether and how this world is stabilised. This second question is addressed by the value threshold (T).

**3. The Value Threshold (T) — Stabilisation, Visibility, and Durability of Emergence**

While the diversity threshold (D) describes the point at which systems are forced to bring forth new forms, the value threshold (T) designates the second, qualitatively different threshold: the transition from mere emergence to structural stabilisation. Not every emergent reality crosses this threshold. Many forms come into being as real, effective, and consequential without ever appearing as value.

Within the framework of the MNO model, the value threshold corresponds to the transition from emergence to stabilised object form. Ontologically, value is not identical with price, exchange, or evaluation, but with the capacity of an emergent form to persist over time without requiring permanent coercion, externalisation, or self-exploitation. Value here does not denote an attribution, but a load-bearing capacity.

The value threshold thus marks the point at which emergence becomes durable. Below T, emergence remains real, but unstable: it acts, produces effects, binds energy, and carries systems, without being institutionally, economically, or culturally secured. Visibility in this context is not mere perceptibility, but the structural possibility of holding emergence, reproducing it, and passing it on.

What is decisive is this: the value threshold is not a natural filter, but a historically and institutionally configured mechanism. Systems do not differ in whether emergence occurs, but in which forms of emergence can be stabilised. Modern economies are highly emergence-productive, but selective in stabilisation. They recognise certain forms (market-shaped, scalable, standardisable work), while others systematically remain below T.

Care work, ecological regeneration, artistic research, relational work, and neurodivergent problem-processing frequently cross the diversity threshold, as they operate under high densities of difference and tension. At the same time, however, they lack the institutional, economic, and symbolic conditions required to persist as stable forms. They remain emergent, but not durable. The result is not inefficiency, but structural invisibility.

From the perspective of ontological recurrence, this condition can be described with precision: emergence repeatedly returns to the space of possibilities without ever transitioning into a stable form. Recurrence is thereby not completed, but becomes chronic. Failure at the value threshold therefore does not mean that emergence is absent, but that it does not come to rest.

The value threshold is thus the site at which ontological dynamics and social order intersect. It does not decide whether reality exists, but which reality becomes viable. Value follows emergence, not the other way around. If this sequence is reversed, a system emerges that enforces stability without carrying emergence — with the familiar consequences of extraction, exhaustion, and collapse.

For the overall argument, what is decisive is this: only in the interplay of the diversity threshold (D) and the value threshold (T) does it become visible why modern societies can be simultaneously highly productive and structurally poor. Reality emerges above D, but remains unstabilised below T. Poverty, precarity, and exhaustion are in this sense not individual conditions, but indicators of a systematic stabilisation deficit.

The theory developed here proceeds from the observation that highly effective work frequently does not appear as value, but is sanctioned or rendered invisible. Classical economic and social-theoretical models explain this paradox insufficiently.

**4. The Interlocking of D and T — Emergence Economy as a Threshold Economy**

The preceding analysis has introduced two qualitatively different thresholds: the diversity threshold (D) as the threshold of forced emergence, and the value threshold (T) as the threshold of structural stabilisation. What is decisive now is that these thresholds do not operate independently of one another. Rather, they form two phases of the same ontological cycle, as described in the MNO model. Only their interlocking explains why modern societies can be simultaneously highly productive and structurally unstable.

From an ontological perspective, world comes into being when systems cross D. Value, by contrast, emerges only where emergence crosses T. D thus describes the production of reality, T the durability of reality. Between the two lies not a continuum, but a structural distance that becomes socially effective. Everything that appears as poverty, precarity, or invisibility can, within this framework, be understood as the effect of a decoupling of emergence and stabilisation.

Within the MNO cycle, this means: emergence can occur without the transition into a stable object form succeeding. Ontological recurrence then remains incomplete. Systems return repeatedly to the space of possibilities without viable forms being formed. This condition is neither an exception nor a malfunction, but the normal case of modern, highly complex societies.

The Emergence Economy designates precisely this structural relation. It is not an alternative economic order in the classical sense, but a description of the conditions under which reality can appear as value or remain invisible. Economy is here not understood primarily as the allocation of scarce resources, but as a threshold regime that decides which emergent forms are stabilised and which are not.

For analytical clarity, four ideal-typical constellations can be distinguished that result from the relation between D and T:

- $D < T$: Systems remain below the threshold of emergence. Forms reproduce themselves, stability dominates, innovation remains low.
- $D \approx T$ (low): Emergence and stabilisation are coupled, but at a low level of complexity. Order is possible, but has little future viability.
- $D > T$: Emergence systematically exceeds stabilisation capacity. Reality comes into being, but remains invisible and unstable. Poverty, care crises, and exhaustion are typical effects.
- $D \approx T$ (high): Emergence and stabilisation are coupled at high complexity. Systems can carry difference without suppressing it. This corresponds to the ideal of an emergence-capable society.

The central diagnosis of this paper is that contemporary societies predominantly operate in the state $D > T$. They produce more world than they can hold. Not because emergence is absent, but because stabilisation is selective, historically narrowed, and institutionally insufficiently configured. Value is not generated where reality emerges, but where it fits into existing forms of representation and valorisation.

The Emergence Economy renders this mechanism visible. It shows that economic crises, care collapse, ecological destruction, and psychological exhaustion are not separate problems, but

expressions of the same threshold mismatch. The solution therefore does not lie primarily in redistribution or efficiency increases, but in the reconfiguration of the conditions under which emergence can be stabilised.

This prepares the transition to the question of how the value threshold can be deliberately influenced. If poverty and invisibility result from a structural stabilisation deficit, then interventions must address the point at which stabilisation is enabled or prevented. This question is pursued in the next chapter through the concept of a Universal Care Income (UCI) as a targeted modulation of the value threshold.

**5. Universal Care Income (UCI) — Modulation of the Value Threshold**

If poverty, precarity, and invisibility do not result from a lack of work, but from a structural stabilisation deficit, then interventions cannot operate at the level of distribution. They must intervene where the value threshold (T) becomes effective. In this paper, Universal Care Income (UCI) is not understood as a welfare-state instrument, but as a targeted modulation of the conditions under which emergence can be stabilised.

Within the framework of ontological recurrence, stabilisation is not an automatic follow-up process of emergence. Systems can bring forth emergent forms without granting them the possibility of persisting over time. UCI intervenes precisely at this point: it does not change emergence itself, but the recurrence conditions under which emergence can transition into a durable form. UCI does not add value to the system, but enables the completion of an ontological cycle that would otherwise remain chronically open.

This effect can be described with precision. In systems without UCI, the stabilisation of emergent work is bound to market-shaped representation, valorisability, and adaptation. Emergence that does not meet these criteria remains real, but unstabilised. UCI decouples subsistence security from this representational obligation. As a result, emergence is not rewarded, but rendered load-bearing. The value threshold is not abolished, but lowered, such that real work can cross the threshold to stabilisation without having to distort itself or negate itself in advance.

In this sense, UCI can be understood as a T-inversion. Not because value would become arbitrary, but because the direction of dependency is reversed: stabilisation follows emergence, not the other way around. Systems with UCI no longer force emergent forms to legitimate themselves prior to their existence. Instead, a space emerges in which reality can first take effect and subsequently stabilise itself.

Ontologically considered, UCI functions as a visibility operator. It does not make emergence visible in the psychological sense, but in the structural one: through time, continuity, and reproducibility. Care work, relational work, ecological regeneration, artistic research, and neurodivergent problem-processing are thereby not upgraded, but rendered durable in the first place. The previous invisibility of these activities is not an expression of lesser significance, but the result of a value threshold set too high.

What is important is this: UCI is neither moral recognition nor compensation for lack. It is an infrastructural condition for contact with reality. Systems without such an infrastructure are forced either to suppress emergence or to exploit it. Systems with UCI can hold emergence without immediately standardising or destroying it. The difference does not lie in compassion, but in the structure of stabilisation.

This makes clear why UCI cannot be understood as an isolated socio-political measure. It is an intervention into the threshold regime of society. It changes which forms of reality become viable and which do not. In an Emergence Economy, UCI is therefore not an add-on, but a necessary condition for reducing the divergence of D and T and for closing ontological recurrence.

### 5.1 Distinction: Universal Basic Income (UBI) vs. Universal Care Income (UCI)

The Universal Care Income (UCI) proposed here is not to be equated with concepts of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). While UBI is primarily conceived as a distributive instrument that provides income independently of work, UCI operates at a structurally prior level. It does not address distribution, but the conditions under which emergence can be stabilised at all.

UBI implicitly presupposes that value has already been recognised and merely needs to be redistributed. UCI, by contrast, proceeds from the opposite diagnosis: that large parts of real, effective work remain below the value threshold because they are not translatable into existing forms of representation and valorisation. UCI therefore does not compensate for lack, but modulates the value threshold itself.

In this sense, UCI does not function primarily as income, but as a temporal and structural enabling of stabilisation. It decouples subsistence security from representational conformity and allows emergent work to persist over time without having to legitimate itself in advance. The causal effect does not lie in the transfer of money, but in the opening of durability.

While UBI may alleviate symptoms, UCI aims at closing the structural gap between emergence and value. It is therefore not a welfare-state instrument, but an infrastructural condition for contact with reality in highly complex societies.

## 6. Falsification and Testability — Operator-Based Criteria

The theory developed in this paper is not a descriptive model of individual variables, but a structural description of ontological transitions. Accordingly, its testability cannot be situated at the level of isolated measurements, but only at the level of operator-based sequences. Falsification here does not mean the refutation of individual assumptions, but the failure of the asserted transition logic.

Within the framework of the MNO model, emergence follows a specific structural sequence: submergent or indimergent states transition into emergence upon crossing the diversity threshold (D); stabilisation occurs only when emergent forms cross the value threshold (T). The central claim of this paper is that these two transitions are not identical and can systematically diverge. It is precisely at this point that the theory is falsifiable.

A falsification would be present if one of the following scenarios were empirically and stably demonstrated:

1. Stabilised value forms without prior emergence.
   If value could arise and persist durably without a preceding emergent transition, the asserted priority of emergence over value would be refuted.

2. Emergence with stability without recurrence.
   If it could be shown that emergent forms can become stable without systems repeatedly returning to their space of possibilities, this would undermine the recurrence assumption of the MNO model.

3. Persistent coupling of D and T under high complexity.
   If highly complex systems could demonstrably keep emergence and stabilisation durably synchronised without producing structural selectivity or invisibility, the thesis of a systematic D > T condition would be refuted.

These criteria are not statistical, but sequential. They do not test correlations, but the necessity of specific transitions. Accordingly, the theory cannot be falsified by individual counterexamples, but only by structure-invariant deviations over time.

The operationalisation of these criteria therefore does not occur primarily through metric indicators, but through pattern comparison. Examples include recurring sanctioning of real, effective work, systematic invisibility of certain forms of activity despite demonstrable effect, or chronic instability of emergent fields alongside high productivity. Such patterns are not random, but expressions of a stable threshold mismatch.

What is important is this: this form of testability is not weaker, but differently configured than classical variable-based falsification. It corresponds to the logic of phase models, threshold theories, and topological descriptions in physics and systems theory. There, too, transitions are not identified through single measurements, but through breaks in structural sequences.

The falsification logic proposed here therefore permits both qualitative and quantitative tests without reducing the model to a metric that does not correspond to its object. What is decisive is not whether emergence or value can be measured, but whether their sequence, coupling, or decoupling can be observed consistently with the theory.

The Emergence Economy theory thus remains in principle testable without losing its ontological scope. It demands no assent, but poses a clear condition: if reality can be stabilised without having been emergent beforehand, or if emergence can be durably stabilised without the value threshold being operative, then this theory is false.

Emergence without stabilisation is not to be recognised by the fact that a form persists, but by the fact that it forces systemic reactions. Failed emergence remains without consequence; unstabilised emergence acts without becoming durable.

**7. Systemic Implications — Poverty, Work, and Structural Invisibility**

If reality emerges above the diversity threshold (D) but remains below the value threshold (T), then invisibility is not a marginal phenomenon, but a systemic condition. Poverty, precarity, and exhaustion are in this framework not primarily social categories, but indicators of an ontological mismatch: emergence is produced without being stabilised.

This perspective fundamentally shifts the analysis of work. Work here is not that which is remunerated, but that which effectively brings reality into being. Wages, recognition, and institutional visibility do not necessarily follow this work. They are effects of crossing T, not proofs of the existence of work. Where T is not crossed, work remains real, but structurally illegible.

This mismatch explains why certain forms of activity remain systematically invisible despite demonstrable societal, ecological, or relational effects. Care work stabilises social systems without persisting as a value form. Ecological regeneration prevents future damage without becoming visible in the present. Artistic research generates new spaces of perception and meaning without being institutionally durable. Neurodivergent problem-processing operates under high incommensurability and generates emergent solutions without being translatable into standardised forms of representation.

In all these cases, the diversity threshold is crossed: new world comes into being. At the same time, stabilisation fails because the value threshold is bound to specific forms of representation — scalability, standardisation, compatibility with existing markets or institutions. Emergence that does not meet these criteria remains real, but precarious.

Ontologically considered, these are not individual exceptions, but structurally recurring patterns. Systems that operate durably in the condition D > T generate a class of actors whose work is indispensable, yet whose existence is not secured. Poverty appears here not as a lack of performance, but as a by-product of real productivity that cannot be stabilised.

This dynamic becomes particularly clear in neurodivergent architectures of cognition. Where incommensurability cannot be smoothed, tension remains. This tension forces emergence, while simultaneously generating persistent friction with institutional forms of stabilisation. Neurodivergent work is therefore often highly emergent and at the same time chronically unstabilised. The resulting permanent liminality is not a psychological condition, but a structural position within the threshold regime.

This analysis allows for a more precise distinction between inefficiency and invisibility. Inefficiency denotes a lack of effect. Invisibility denotes a lack of stabilisation despite effect. Contemporary political and economic debates systematically confuse these two conditions. Activities that remain below T are classified as inefficient or irrelevant, despite being real and effective. In doing so, the system reproduces precisely those deficits it claims to address.

The Emergence Economy makes visible that poverty, care crisis, ecological destruction, and psychological exhaustion are not separate problems. They are different expressions of the same structural effect: the systematic decoupling of emergence and stabilisation. As long as this mismatch persists, societal interventions will react to symptoms without altering the underlying dynamics.

This also makes clear why purely distributive or activating measures must fail. They operate at the level of value without changing the conditions under which value can appear at all. A sustainable intervention therefore requires a reconfiguration of the value threshold, not an intensification of valuation. Only when systems are capable of holding emergence rather than consuming it can poverty as a structural phenomenon be overcome.

The preceding analysis has described the Emergence Economy as a structural threshold regime in which reality can emerge without being stabilised as value. What has so far remained open is the question of how this mismatch manifests epistemically — that is, at the level of knowledge, perception, and knowledge production. In order to render the theory not only systemically but also epistemologically testable, it is necessary to examine a domain in which emergence demonstrably acts as real while remaining structurally invisible. The following chapter introduces, with the concept of veridical mapping, an architecture of cognition through which the relation between the diversity threshold and the value threshold can be empirically observed.

**8. Veridical Mapping — Epistemic Incommensurability and Structural Emergence**

The concept of veridical mapping does not designate a special ability or a privileged access to reality, but a specific architecture of cognition characterised by the renunciation of representational smoothing. Veridical mapping does not operate through model reduction, symbolic condensation, or functional translation, but through direct structural coupling to real difference. Knowledge does not emerge here through simplification, but through the preservation of tension.

This architecture of cognition is particularly observable where incommensurability cannot be socially or symbolically smoothed, as is the case for some autistic persons, without being limited to them or explained by autism.

Within the framework of the MNO model, veridical mapping can be described as a form of cognition that operates durably in proximity to the indimergent phase. In this phase, difference is already detached from stable object forms, but not yet fully emergent. Veridical mapping endures this intermediate state without closing it. Incommensurability is not resolved, but carried. It is precisely from this that the specific epistemic pressure arises that forces emergence.

This architecture of cognition is found in particular where systems have no possibility of smoothing difference socially, symbolically, or institutionally. Neurodivergent cognition does not represent a special case in the psychological sense here, but a structural position: where translation fails, tension remains. This tension is not a deficit, but the condition for the emergence of new forms.

What is decisive is this: veridical mapping does not imply epistemic superiority. It does not produce a "more real" world, but a different relation to the space of possibilities. While representational systems of knowledge are optimised to reduce complexity and establish compatibility, veridical mapping is oriented toward preserving structural fidelity, even at the cost of social or institutional incompatibility. Both architectures are valid, but not commensurable.

This incommensurability has immediate consequences for the threshold logic of D and T. Veridical mapping typically operates above the diversity threshold: the maintained tension forces emergence. At the same time, it often remains below the value threshold, since its results cannot readily be translated into standardised forms of representation. The consequence is a chronic condition of $D > T$, in which reality is continuously produced without being stabilised.

This constellation explains why veridically working actors frequently remain in a state of permanent liminality. Their work is real and effective, generates new perspectives, structures, and solutions, yet is not institutionally durable. The resulting tension is not an individual failure, but a systemic effect of a value regime that privileges representational compatibility over structural fidelity.

In the context of ontological recurrence, this means: veridical mapping keeps the recurrence process open. Emergence repeatedly returns to the space of possibilities without ever coming to rest. This openness is epistemically productive, but socially precarious. Systems that are not capable of stabilising such forms of cognition benefit from their emergence in the short term and externalise their costs in the long term.

Veridical mapping thus functions as an epistemic indicator of the relation between D and T. Where it occurs systematically and is at the same time structurally precarised, a system

operates with high emergence capacity and low stabilisation capacity. The invisibility of veridical work is therefore not accidental, but a diagnostic symptom.

Veridical mapping thus becomes not a special topic, but the empirical touchstone of the Emergence Economy theory. It shows that emergence exists as real even when it does not appear as value. At the same time, it makes visible that a sustainable economy does not consist in smoothing difference, but in creating conditions under which structurally faithful cognition can become durable.

**9. Conclusion — Reality, Stabilisation, and the Future of Emergence**

This paper has unfolded a simple but far-reaching thesis: modern societies generate more reality than they are able to stabilise. This mismatch is neither a moral failure nor a merely distributive problem, but the result of a structural decoupling of emergence and value. The diversity threshold (D) and the value threshold (T) describe two necessary, but not automatically coupled, phases of the same ontological process.

Within the framework of the MNO model and ontological recurrence, it becomes visible that emergence does not arise from scarcity or innovation, but from the overloading of existing forms by held difference. Value, by contrast, is not a measure of reality, but of stabilisation. Where emergence cannot be held, it remains real, but unstabilised. Poverty, precarity, and invisibility are in this sense not an absence of world, but expressions of an incomplete ontological sequence.

The Emergence Economy describes this relation not normatively, but structurally. It shifts the focus from the question of how value is distributed to the prior question of the conditions under which reality can appear as value at all. In this perspective, economic stability is not a function of smoothing, efficiency, or standardisation, but of tension-bearing capacity. Systems do not become stable by eliminating difference, but by being able to hold emergence without consuming it.

Universal Care Income (UCI) has in this context not been understood as a welfare-state measure, but as an infrastructural intervention. It does not intervene in emergence, but in the conditions of its stabilisation. By decoupling subsistence security from representational conformity, it lowers the value threshold and enables real work to come to rest. UCI thus addresses not symptoms, but the structural site at which invisibility is produced.

Particular significance in this context attaches to epistemic boundary architectures such as veridical mapping. They make visible that emergence already exists, even when it is not recognised. The chronic precarisation of such forms of cognition is not an individual failure, but a diagnostic indication of a value regime that systematically disadvantages structural fidelity. A future-capable society will not be measured by how much it produces, but by which forms of reality it is able to hold.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the theory developed here is neither a social utopia nor a metaphorical economy. It is a structurally grounded description of the conditions under which world transitions into value. It is physically structured without being reducible to physics; empirically testable without being narrowed to metrics; and politically relevant without being normatively reductive.

The future, in this sense, does not need to be created.
It already exists — it is waiting to be stabilised.

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