

# Beyond Intelligence

## Emergence, Operator Relativity, and an Autistic Epistemology

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### Abstract

Modern cognitive and intelligence research operates with an implicit misunderstanding: it treats intelligence as a primary, objective, and context-independent property of subjects, while presupposing as given the possibility space within which intelligence is measured and compared.

This paper intervenes prior to that space: not at the level of performance within stable conditions, but at the level of the question of how such conditions are ontologically and epistemically stabilized in the first place.

The paper develops a counter-model in which emergence is introduced as a fundamental epistemic variable. Emergence is not understood as a gradual increase in performance, but as a threshold phenomenon that occurs when predictive simulation is no longer sufficient to sustain world-relation. Emergence is always operator-relative and socially situated; within this framework, intelligence appears as a secondary stabilizing performance. On this basis, autism is re-read not as a deficit or cognitive style, but as an epistemic configuration in which emergence becomes more likely while at the same time being structurally blockable. Without emergence, intelligence remains simulation; with emergence, intelligence becomes possible—but conflictual, costly, and socially risky.

The argument developed here does not begin with cognitive performances within given conditions, but with the question of how such conditions are produced at all. Classical intelligence measurements operate within deliberately constructed spaces: temporally emptied, socially isolated, affectively neutralized, and normatively pre-structured. The so-called “white room” of the intelligence test is not a neutral background, but the result of a spatial operation that first reduces world in order to produce comparability.

Within this framework, intelligence measures adaptability to an already stabilized possibility space. The stabilization of this space itself remains invisible—and it is precisely here that this paper intervenes.

*(This paper is an interface text. The author's primary research corpus employs an autistic, non-linear, rhythmically recursive writing mode that cannot be fully preserved in academic English without structural loss of epistemic function.)*

## 1. Intelligence as a Historical Concept of Pacification

The modern concept of intelligence does not arise accidentally, but as a response to a social problem: the comparability of human beings under industrial, bureaucratic, and educational-policy conditions. From the outset, intelligence functions as a concept of stabilization. It allows differences to be quantified, performances to be normed, and deviations to be administered, without having to call the structure of the world itself into question.

In doing so, intelligence is tacitly treated as something that

- exists independently of context,
- can be transported from one situation to another,
- and can be linearly increased or diminished.

This assumption is epistemically convenient, but ontologically questionable. It presupposes that the possibility space within which intelligence operates is stable. Yet this very presupposition is never itself thematized.

Within this framework, autism inevitably appears distorted. It is interpreted either as a lack of intelligence, as an uneven distribution of intelligence, or as a special profile within the same metric. What is not asked is whether the metric itself is blind to those forms of knowledge that do not arise within stable frameworks, but at their edges.

The critique developed here is therefore not directed empirically against individual intelligence theories, but categorically against their basic assumption. A structurally identical misplacement has already been elaborated by the author in adjacent domains: in information-theoretical ontologies, observer-centered models of measurement, and representational theories of perception.

In all these cases, response-forms to structural overload—information, observation, measurement results—are mistakenly treated as ontological or epistemic origins. Intelligence theory reproduces the same error by treating stabilization performances as primary explanations, without reflecting on the conditions under which stabilization becomes necessary at all.

By the stability of the possibility space, this paper does not mean an abstract context, but a concretely produced cognitive and social space: a space in which task formats, temporal structures, goal definitions, evaluative standards, and exclusion criteria are already fixed. The classical intelligence test is a paradigmatic example: it isolates subjects within an artificially de-worlded space in order to produce comparability.

Within this framework, intelligence does not measure world-relation, but adaptability to an already stabilized space. Yet the stabilization of this space itself is not explained; it is silently presupposed.

## 2. Emergence as the Loss of the Taken-for-Grantedness of World

In everyday life—as well as in most models of cognitive science—it is tacitly assumed that the world is fundamentally manageable. Situations appear surveyable, problems solvable, demands copable with. Perception, thinking, and action interlock without this coupling itself becoming thematic. In this state, the world does not appear alien, but self-evident.

This self-evidence, however, is not grounded in truth, but in simulation. What is meant here is not deception, but an everyday, highly functional practice: the world is continuously pre-calculated (predictive coding), smoothed, and simplified. Expectations replace immediate experience, routines replace openness, social conventions replace situational negotiation. As long as this simulation remains viable, the world appears stable.

In this paper, emergence does not denote an increase in ability or performance, but the point at which this taken-for-grantedness is lost. It occurs where simulation is no longer sufficient to sustain world-relation. The world is then no longer anticipated, but experienced as resistant. Problems can no longer be “solved,” because they no longer appear as clearly delimited tasks. What comes to the fore is no longer the solution, but the non-fit between expectation and reality.

This shift is not a purely inner-psychic process. It does not arise from subjective confusion, but from an overload of existing models. The higher the resolution with which differences are perceived, the less smoothing takes effect, the more quickly predictions reach their limit. Emergence is therefore not a universal state, but relative to the conditions under which the world could previously be simulated.

In order to grasp this relativity, the concept of the epistemic operator is introduced here. The operator does not denote a mental structure, a schema, or a frame of reference. Rather, it denotes a pre-cognitive, relational invariance that determines

- which differences can appear at all,
- which degree of resolution can be held,
- where simplification takes effect,
- and from which point onward collapse becomes unavoidable.

The operator is not a representation of the world, but a condition of world stabilization.

Accordingly, the operator is not to be understood as an inner schema, but as a relational condition of what can count as a relevant difference for a system at all. It determines, for example, whether social irritation is smoothed over, sensory deviation ignored, or temporal asynchrony compensated. The operator does not determine what is thought, but where thinking reaches its limit.

In order to capture this transition precisely, the concept of the diversity threshold is introduced. It designates the threshold beyond which held difference can no longer be integrated. Below this threshold, simulation remains viable: the world can be smoothed, pre-calculated, and functionally replaced. Beyond this threshold, simulation loses its viability; difference is no longer processed, but becomes experientially present.

As long as perceived difference remains within the limits held by the operator, simulation remains viable. Cognition then operates functionally, efficiently, and often at a high level of performance—yet epistemically shielded. Only beyond a certain threshold, here referred to as the diversity threshold, does simulation lose its viability. This threshold does not mark an abstract point, but the moment at which held difference can no longer be integrated.

Above this threshold, the distance between world and model becomes experientially accessible. The world no longer appears as what was expected, but as what withdraws. Emergence therefore does not mean “more thinking,” but more world—and at the same time the loss of the second level on which the world had previously been neutralized, replaced, or pre-calculated.

Within the MNO framework, emergence is accordingly not a cognitive achievement, but a structural response to non-integrability. An analogous process can be found in physical measurement processes: determinacy arises there not through knowledge, but through enforced stabilization when openness is no longer viable. Here too, the result is not a source of knowledge, but a response-form to overload.

In this sense, intelligence occupies the same ontological position as information or measurement results. It is not the origin of world-relation, but a form that cognition assumes under structural pressure. Without prior emergence, intelligence remains simulation.

The epistemic operator is here deliberately not positively ontologically determined. Any such reification would once again turn it into an explanatory entity, even though it precisely marks the boundary at which explanatory entities lose their viability.

### 3. Intelligence as Subsequent Stabilization

Within this framework, intelligence becomes newly legible. It is not the origin of knowledge, but a secondary performance that takes effect where emergence has already occurred. Intelligence stabilizes, shapes, and operationalizes. It builds new simulations—but it does not generate them out of nothing.

Precisely high intelligence can delay or prevent emergence. The more powerful a system is in simulation, the longer it can avoid collapse. In such cases, a form of highly developed yet epistemically closed cognition emerges: complex, elegant, efficient—and at the same time world-poor.

In this sense, intelligence is not the opposite of emergence, but its byproduct. Where emergence is blocked, intelligence remains trapped in a circuit of self-confirmation.

Without emergence, intelligence is nothing other than simulation.

*Marginal note:* Contemporary AI systems illustrate this thesis paradigmatically. They operate with high intelligence within stabilized task spaces, without ever being exposed to the experience of non-integrability. Their performance shows that simulation, optimization, and inference are not equivalent to world-relation, but rather reach their maximum precisely where emergence is systematically excluded.

In this model, emergence and intelligence are not opposites, but asymmetrically intertwined. Emergence designates the point at which modelability breaks down; intelligence designates the subsequent stabilizing performance within the spaces thereby newly opened or constrained.

This does not mean that intelligence is epistemically irrelevant, but that without prior emergence it operates exclusively within simulation and therefore cannot reflect its own limits.

*Marginal note: Artificial Intelligence*

The conception of intelligence developed here allows for a clear distinction with respect to so-called artificial intelligences. Contemporary AI systems operate entirely within stabilized possibility spaces. They optimize, combine, and simulate patterns with high efficiency, without ever reaching the point at which modelability itself becomes questionable.

In this sense, AI systems possess intelligence, but not emergence. What they lack is not computational power, but world-relation: they are not exposed to the experience of non-integrability, but move exclusively within given, externally stabilized spaces.

AI thus illustrates paradigmatically the thesis advanced here: intelligence can be highly developed without becoming epistemically open. It shows what intelligence is when emergence is systematically excluded.

#### 4. Autism as an Epistemic Threshold Configuration

Against the background developed here, autism does not appear as a special case of intelligence, nor as a mere variant of cognitive performance profiles. Rather, it can be described as an epistemic configuration in which the probability of emergence is increased. This does not imply qualitative superiority or privilege, but a shifted structural position in the relation between simulation, difference, and world-relation.

What characterizes this position is not a deficit, but a different weighting of epistemic conditions—among them a reduced taken-for-grantedness of social simulation, heightened sensory and relational resolution, and a lower tolerance for smoothing and simplification. As a consequence, the threshold at which simulation loses its viability and difference can no longer be integrated is reached earlier—the boundary referred to here as the diversity threshold.

Autistic cognition therefore more frequently encounters situations in which established models no longer hold. In such moments, the world is not presupposed but directly experienced—often as overload, pain, or rupture, and not infrequently without linguistic or social possibilities of connection. Crucially, this condition is not an expression of deficient adaptability, but the result of a configuration in which prediction and smoothing operate less reliably.

The difference between autistic individuals who internally break under this non-fit with the world and those who are able to formulate new scientific, artistic, or theoretical models is not a difference in truth or in the epistemic structure itself. Rather, it is a difference in externalizability under given individual, social, and material conditions. Both follow the same internal epistemic operator; only in some cases does it become possible to stabilize this operator, articulate it, or translate it into shared forms.

Accordingly, the description of autism employed here explicitly makes no claim to phenomenological completeness or clinical typification. It does not aim to capture individual traits, but to describe a structural position within the process of world-formation that can manifest under very different conditions. The differences lie not in the operator itself, but in the possibility of sustaining its effects, translating them, or rendering them socially connectable.

#### 5. Connection, Blockage, and Societal Violence

Emergence is never a purely individual event. It depends on temporal leeway, protection from forced stabilization, and institutional elasticity. Where these conditions are absent, emergence is not recognized as an epistemic phenomenon, but is pathologized, disciplined, or destroyed. Educational systems, labor markets, and clinical regimes have historically been designed to reward simulation, adaptation, and reproducibility—and to sanction forms of knowledge that interrupt these logics.

These blockages are not accidental. Modern educational, labor, and administrative systems depend on keeping cognitive performances comparable, predictable, and normable. Within this framework, emergence is not merely disruptive, but dangerous, because it interrupts comparability and withdraws from governability. Intelligence functions here as a legitimating concept for stabilization, not as a neutral concept of knowledge.

The absence of visible emergence is therefore not evidence of its absence, but often an indicator of successful blockage. World-relation can be real without becoming socially connectable.

Certain forms of autistic configurations make these blockages particularly apparent. Where social simulation is associated with elevated costs, where sensory or relational resolution is high, and where smoothing operates only to a limited extent, the collapse of predictive models becomes experientially accessible at an earlier point. In such cases, emergence does not necessarily occur in a productive sense; what becomes evident instead is the limit of existing possibility spaces.

In this limited, structural sense, autism functions as an epistemic stress test: not because it is emergent per se, but because it renders visible the societal conditions under which emergence can either connect—or be systematically prevented. What is decisive here is not the diagnosis, but the constellation of perceptual resolution, simulation costs, and institutional modes of response.

## 6. Consequence: A Reordering of the Concept of Knowledge

If emergence precedes intelligence, the central questions shift accordingly.

No longer:

*How intelligent is someone?*

but rather:

*Where can emergence arise—and where is it prevented?*

This shift concerns not only autism, but the foundations of science, labor, education, and technology. It explains why artificial systems can appear highly intelligent without ever having a world, and why human knowledge becomes most precise precisely where it is most vulnerable.

## Emergence Against Intelligence Theories

Classical models of intelligence—especially factor-analytic approaches such as the *g* factor—abstract away precisely those moments in which epistemic frameworks themselves become unstable. They presuppose stable task spaces, measurable performances, and transferable competencies.

What they cannot capture is the point at which the task space itself collapses. Emergence lies outside general intelligence, because it does not occur within problems, but at the boundary where problem structures themselves lose their viability.

In this model, emergence is not an empirical parameter, but a categorical boundary determination. It does not designate a measurable event within existing models, but the point at which modelability itself loses its viability. An empirical operationalization would therefore not be incorrect, but categorically inadequate.

## 7. Why Classical Intelligence Theories Systematically Miss Emergence

The persistent dominance of the concept of intelligence rests less on its theoretical explanatory power than on its institutional compatibility. Intelligence theories are successful because they align with systems that require stability, comparability, and controllability. They do not provide a theory of the world, but a theory of the *utilizability* of cognition under stabilized conditions.

This becomes evident in three influential paradigms: the *g* factor, Predictive Processing, and the Bayesian Brain. Despite significant conceptual differences, they share a central, rarely reflected presupposition:

They assume a stable possibility space within which cognition can operate, be measured, and be compared.

It is precisely this presupposition that is not merely relativized by emergence, but annulled.

### 7.1 The *g* Factor: Intelligence as Abstracted Stability

The classical *g* factor, introduced by Charles Spearman, understands intelligence as a general, context-transcending capacity for performance. Different cognitive tasks are assumed to correlate because they draw on a shared underlying resource.

This model is successful where task spaces are already defined, stabilized, and normed. It measures efficiency within familiar structures, transfer between similar formats, as well as speed and accuracy under controlled conditions.

What it cannot, in principle, capture is the collapse of the task space itself.

Emergence—understood as the loss of the viability of simulation—lies outside the *g* factor. Where no stable problem structure exists, no general problem-solving capacity can take effect. The *g* factor systematically abstracts away precisely those differences that are constitutive of emergence.

For this reason, the *g* factor is not wrong, but secondary:

it describes stabilizing performances *after* emergence, not the conditions of its possibility.

### 7.2 Predictive Processing: When Prediction Becomes Ontology

Predictive Processing approaches conceive of cognition as a hierarchical prediction machine. Perception serves to minimize prediction error; the world appears as that which produces deviations from expectations.

This model is powerful wherever prediction remains, in principle, viable. Its problem begins where this condition is no longer met. Predictive Processing can explain how systems remain stable. It cannot explain when stability itself becomes untenable.

At the moment emergence occurs, the error is not simply larger—the error becomes unmanageable because the predictive framework itself collapses. The world does not become surprising, but no longer modelable.

At this point, Predictive Processing shifts from a theory of cognition into an ideology of simulation: everything that cannot be integrated appears as disturbance, noise, or pathology. Within this framework,

autism is inevitably misunderstood—not as an epistemic threshold configuration, but as a deficit in error weighting.

Emergence disappears from view because it contradicts the model's foundational assumptions.

### 7.3 Bayesian Brain: Probability Without World

The Bayesian Brain paradigm radicalizes this logic by modeling cognition entirely as probabilistic inference. Within this framework, the world does not appear as a resistant reality, but as a probability distribution over hypotheses.

As long as probability spaces remain stable, this model is extraordinarily powerful. Its blind spot lies precisely where emergence sets in. Emergence is not an update of a distribution; it is the collapse of the distribution space itself.

When difference is no longer integrable, priors offer no help.

When the epistemic operator itself becomes visible, inference loses its foundation.

The Bayesian Brain can describe how intelligence is simulated, optimized, and stabilized.

It cannot explain how world comes into being when simulation fails.

## 8. Autistic Configurations as an Epistemic Stress Test for Intelligence-Centrism

The following considerations do not refer to autism as a comprehensive clinical category, but to specific constellations of autistic world-relation. What is meant are configurations in which heightened perceptual resolution, high costs of social simulation, and low institutional elasticity converge. What is decisive here is not the diagnosis, but the structural position within the relation between simulation, difference, and connection.

In classical intelligence theories as well as in predictive and Bayesian paradigms, autism is predominantly interpreted along the same axis: as a deviation in performance, a disturbance of prediction, or an atypical form of inference. These readings vary in detail, but share a fundamental presupposition: they locate the problem at the level of cognition, not at the level of the conditions under which cognition can operate in a stable way at all.

What is systematically overlooked is that certain autistic configurations represent less a problem of cognitive capacity than a problem of the epistemic threshold. Where social simulation is associated with elevated costs, where sensory or relational resolution is high, and where smoothing operates only to a limited extent, the boundary at which simulation loses its viability is reached earlier.

In such constellations, simulation collapses more quickly, simplification is less effective, and the world is experienced more directly—yet at the same time as difficult to sustain. Within an intelligence paradigm, this appears as deficit or dysfunction. Within an emergence paradigm, it becomes legible as an epistemic intensification: not as a lack of thinking, but as an earlier confrontation with non-integrability.

What is decisive is not that emergence occurs, but whether it can connect. Without temporal, social, and institutional possibilities of connection, emergence does not become productive, but destructive—regardless of its epistemic relevance.

Empirical phenomena such as veridical mapping, savant-like precision, or heightened relational accuracy should therefore not be interpreted as cognitive advantages within an intelligence framework. Rather, they point to an access to relational structures prior to social and symbolic stabilization. Their epistemic significance lies not in performance, but in their position within the process of world-formation.

In this sense, autistic cognition is neither deficient nor exceptionally intelligent. It is differently positioned: closer to the threshold at which the world is still coming into being, rather than already being simulated. Precisely for this reason, certain autistic configurations function as an epistemic stress test for theories that treat intelligence as a primary explanatory concept.

An empirical consequence of this model consists in assessing emergence not through performance measures, but through costs of stabilization: temporal expenditure, exhaustion through simulation, meltdown risks, masking effort, institutional sanctions, or the need for withdrawal and protection. Within this framework, knowledge appears not as an increase in performance, but as a structurally risky state.

## 9. Emergence as a Prior Condition of Intelligence

With the shift from intelligence to emergence, a central and often unquestioned hierarchy is reordered. Intelligence no longer appears as the origin of knowledge; rather, emergence appears as the condition under which knowledge becomes possible at all.

Not:

*More intelligence → more knowledge*

but:

*Emergence → possibility of knowledge → need for intelligence as stabilization*

Within this framework, intelligence is neither the origin nor the measure of epistemic truth. It is a response-form: a subsequent performance that takes effect where emergence has already occurred and must be sustained. Intelligence stabilizes, operationalizes, and condenses—but it does not replace the rupture from which knowledge arises.

Where emergence is blocked, intelligence remains in the mode of simulation. It optimizes without opening world. Where emergence can connect, intelligence becomes productive—not in the sense of linear performance increase, but as a means of articulation, translation, and shared stabilization.

Certain autistic configurations make this dynamic particularly visible. Where social simulation is associated with elevated costs and smoothing operates less reliably, the boundary of simulation becomes experientially accessible at an earlier point. In this sense, autistic epistemology is not a special case, but an exposed constellation in which the tension between emergence and stabilization that underlies all knowledge becomes visible.

The concepts of emergence and simulation are not positioned here as symmetrical opposites, but as different regimes of stability within the same ontological process.

Not every overload, not every exhaustion, and not every crisis constitutes emergence. Emergence is present only where existing forms of world-integration themselves lose their validity, not merely their efficiency.

## Condensed Core Statement

Intelligence theories explain how systems function within stabilized possibility spaces.

Emergence describes how such spaces come into being, collapse, or are reconfigured.

Certain autistic configurations make this transition particularly visible, because under given conditions simulation reaches its limits earlier here.

Across different theoretical domains, a structurally analogous inversion becomes apparent: information, observation, measurement, and intelligence function as response-forms to ontological overload—not as primary explanatory principles.

## Conclusion

Emergence precedes intelligence.

Intelligence stabilizes what emergence opens.

Without emergence, intelligence remains simulation.

With emergence, intelligence becomes possible—but costly, conflictual, and not neutral.

In this light, autism does not appear as a deviation, but as a configuration under which the epistemic preconditions of modern societies become exemplarily visible.

This model does not claim to replace or delegitimize intelligence. It aims to shift its epistemic location: from a presumed origin of knowledge to a secondary response to emergence.

The theory developed here does not claim falsifiability in the sense of operationalized performance models. Rather, it offers a framework for analyzing the conditions under which such models become meaningful, blind, or violent.

Structural parallels to phenomenological descriptions (e.g., the breakdown of readiness-to-hand) are recognizable, but are not taken up here, since the focus lies not on forms of experience, but on ontological conditions of stability.

## Antitheses: Emergence Against Intelligence

*(A Systematic Juxtaposition)*

### Thesis 1 – Against the Objectivity of Intelligence

Intelligence is not an objective, general property of subjects.

It is a context-dependent stabilizing performance within already held possibility spaces.

What appears as “intelligence” is always relative to an epistemic operator and to the conditions under which simulation remains viable.

The assumption of context-free intelligence obscures the fact that what is measured is what has already been stabilized, not what opens up world.

### Thesis 2 – Against the Primacy of Performance

Performance is not a measure of knowledge.

It measures adaptability to existing structures, not their epistemic adequacy.

High performance can be epistemically blind;

low performance epistemically precise.  
Intelligence theories confuse stability with truth.

### Thesis 3 – Emergence Precedes Intelligence

Emergence is the condition of possibility of intelligence, not the other way around.

Emergence designates the moment at which:

- simulation collapses,
- prediction no longer holds,
- the world can no longer be replaced.

Only after this rupture can intelligence:

- stabilize new models,
- hold new forms,
- build new simulations.

Without emergence, intelligence remains simulation.

### Thesis 4 – Against Predictive Processing as Ontology

Predictive Processing describes how systems remain stable,  
not how world comes into being.

Emergence is not an increased prediction error,  
but the collapse of error minimization itself.

Where everything is modeled as prediction,  
world disappears as resistance.

Predictive Processing is a theory of adaptation, not of knowledge.

### Thesis 5 – Against the Bayesian Brain as an Epistemology

Bayesian models operate within given probability spaces.

Emergence is the collapse of these spaces.

When difference is no longer integrable,  
no priors, no updates, no inference are of help.

Probability explains simulation—not reality.

### Thesis 6 – Autism Is Not an Intelligence Problem

Autism is not a deviation on an intelligence scale,  
but an epistemic configuration of increased likelihood of emergence.

Characteristic are:

- earlier reaching of the diversity threshold,
- reduced smoothing of difference,
- reduced viability of social simulation.

Within an intelligence paradigm this appears as deficit.

Within an emergence paradigm it appears as structural intensification.

### Thesis 7 – Functionality Is Not a Criterion of Truth

What functions socially

is not necessarily world-adequate.

Systems reward simulation

because it is stabilizable.

Emergence is dangerous because it destabilizes norms.  
That it is suppressed  
says more about societies than about subjects.

Thesis 8 – Against Giftedness as Linear Increase  
Giftedness is not “more” intelligence,  
but a possible consequence of increased representational resolution.  
High intelligence can:

- enable emergence,
- delay it,
- or fully absorb it in an indimergent way.

Not every high intelligence becomes emergent.  
Not every emergence becomes intelligible.

Thesis 9 – Emergence Is Operator-Relative  
Emergence never exists in the abstract.  
It is always relative to:

- an epistemic operator,
- a social context,
- a possibility of connection.

Where emergence finds no connection,  
it remains mute, painful, or destructive.  
The absence of knowledge is therefore often not an individual failure,  
but a structural blockage.

Thesis 10 – Autism as an Epistemic Stress Test  
Autism is not a special case of cognition,  
but a test case for epistemic theories.  
Any theory that can explain autism only as deficit  
fails at the threshold of knowledge itself.  
Autism reveals where intelligence theories end  
and where emergence begins.

#### Final Statement

Intelligence explains how systems function within stabilized worlds.  
Emergence explains how such worlds come into being, collapse, or are reconfigured.  
Certain autistic configurations make this transition visible, because under given conditions simulation  
reaches its limits earlier here.

This paper develops a categorical framework. It does not aim to replace empirical autism research or  
intelligence measurement, but to clarify the epistemic conditions under which such research becomes  
possible, limited, or blind.

This paper is situated in the context of:

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Speed, T. (2025). Artificial Systems Without World - Why World-Formation and Technical Usability Are Structurally Incompatible - Ontological Limits of Artificial Intelligence in Light of ANP, MNO, and Observer Structure (2 English). Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18006914>

Speed, T. (2025). Veridical Mapping as a Spatial Operation - Neurodivergent Cognition Beyond Representational Models (Version 1). Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18032384>

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