

Time Difference Without Neutralization

An Ontological Supplement to Relativity Theory

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18115940>

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Abstract

In modern physics, time is successfully treated as a measurable quantity. Relativity theory precisely describes how time passes differently under gravitation and motion. This formal description is empirically correct and technically sufficient. It remains, however, ontologically incomplete.

The present text argues that time differences are not merely measurable deviations, but irreversible shifts in the conditions under which world has occurred at all. Time is not a neutral medium and not an interchangeable parameter. Time differences are not empty.

Using the well-known example of two clocks that are separated and later reunited, it is shown that relativity theory explains how time diverges, but not why this difference cannot be neutralized and instead remains effective as history. This blind spot is not a failure of physics, but a consequence of its necessary abstraction.

The text therefore proposes an ontological supplement: time is not that within which world takes place, but the irreversible condition-structure of world-binding. Time differences can be compared, but not emptied. This perspective explains why synchronization does not erase the past, why memory is necessarily distorted, and why time cannot be understood as an empty quantity.

(This paper is an interface text within a larger operator-based research program. Core concepts are employed here in application, not re-derived. The underlying research corpus operates in a non-linear, rhythmically recursive mode of structural analysis that cannot be fully preserved in standard academic English without loss of epistemic resolution. The author's primary research practice is grounded in an autistic mode of structural perception; the present text provides an interface translation of this work for academic contexts.)

This paper is directly related to:

Speed, T. (2025). Why Time Is Directed: World Stabilization as an Ontological Condition (Version 1). Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18096277>

Speed, T. (2025). The Curve of the World - Why World-Binding Cannot Be Linear — Shift of Being, Time, and the Impossibility of the Archive (Version 1). Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18097931>

1. Introduction – The Blind Spot of Successful Time Models

Modern physics possesses highly precise models of time. Time dilation can be measured, clocks can be compared, deviations can be calculated and technically compensated. These achievements are undisputed. They are based, however, on a tacit assumption that is rarely made explicit: that time in these models is ontologically treated as a formally manageable quantity. Time appears as a variable whose differences are relevant for calculation and technology, but not for questions of history, binding, or irreversibility.

Time is thereby modeled as a neutral parameter that can assume different values without itself exerting any conditional effect. Differences are regarded as comparable, correctable, and in principle neutralizable. This assumption is functionally necessary for physical modeling—and precisely therein lies its ontological limit. The question of whether time differences are more than numerical deviations is not posed, because it cannot be posed within the formal description.

The present text takes up this point. It does not claim that physical models of time are false. Rather, it shows that they deliberately rest on an abstraction in which history is bracketed out. This bracketing is not a deficiency, but a condition of their precision. Ontologically, however, it remains unclear why time differences are not reversible, why they cannot be neutralized, and why synchronization does not erase the past.

The models implicitly behave as if the formal reset-ability of a time variable were also ontologically without consequence. The possibility of aligning time values is tacitly confused with the reversibility of history. Where history is systematically excluded, irreversibility cannot be explained, but only bypassed. By “resetting,” no physical operation is meant here, but rather an ontological gap in the model assumptions: the assumption that time differences are calculable, yet without conditions.

The text argues that precisely this assumption falls short. Time differences are not mere numerical differences, but mark irreversible shifts in the conditions under which world has occurred. The physical description remains valid—but it remains ontologically incomplete.

2. The Clock Example – Formally Correct, Ontologically Insufficient

The well-known thought experiment of two synchronized clocks is considered a paradigmatic example of relativistic time. Two identical clocks are first synchronized, then separated and exposed to different gravitational or kinematic conditions. After their reunion, they display

different times. Relativity theory fully explains this result. It precisely describes why the deviation arises, how large it is, and under which conditions it occurs.

From a physical standpoint, everything is thus accounted for. Ontologically, however, it is not. Within the physical description, the time difference appears as a pure numerical deviation. It is implicitly assumed that the clocks themselves have remained ontologically identical and that only their readings differ. It is precisely at this point that the necessary clarification begins.

For what has actually occurred cannot be reduced to a deviation of display. The clocks are not merely carriers of different measured values; they have existed under different, no longer reversible world conditions. They have passed through different world trajectories. This difference can be measured, compared, and technically compensated—but it cannot be ontologically neutralized.

3. The Decisive Point: Synchronization Does Not Erase History

Synchronization is a formal act. It aligns displays, not conditions. When the time difference between two clocks is subsequently equalized, the history through which this difference arose does not disappear. The physical description treats the deviation as a correctable quantity. Ontologically, however, it remains effective as an irreversible shift in conditions.

Time difference, in this sense, is not empty. It does not exist as a content stored or transferred somewhere, but as a non-reversible difference in the world conditions under which something has occurred. This difference cannot be annulled without denying history itself. One can align displays, but one cannot undo the fact that world has taken place under different conditions.

The assumption that time differences are neutral rests on a confusion between comparability and reversibility. That time differences are comparable does not mean that they are empty. Comparison does not replace history. Synchronization does not replace world-binding.

4. The Deposit Bottle Analogy

The misunderstanding can be captured with a simple image. The image does not serve to explain physical processes, but to mark an ontological boundary:

It is as if one were to assume that an empty deposit bottle could fill itself simply because it is placed next to a full one.

Comparison does not replace content.

Synchronization does not replace history.

Relativity theory compares time.

It does not fill it.

This is not an accusation, but a boundary determination.

5. Time Is Not a Container – Time Is Trace and the Holding-Open of Possibility

The ontological clarification proposed here addresses a tacit assumption operative in many models of time: the notion that time is a medium within which world takes place. In this perspective, events appear as contents unfolding within a temporal frame, while time itself is

conceived as an empty carrier. This conception is deeply entrenched because it corresponds to everyday experience: time is thought of as something that “passes,” while things happen within it.

It is precisely this conception that is rejected here—not because it would be unintelligible, but because it is ontologically misleading. It suggests that world is embedded in an already existing time, as if what happens could be separated from its temporal frame. This separation, however, is itself already the result of an abstraction. It belongs to model construction, not to the structure of world.

Time is not a medium in which world occurs. It is also not a container that fills or empties. Time is not that which receives events, but the condition under which occurrence does not remain without consequence. Time is the signature of the fact that world has occurred irreversibly. It arises where world binds, and it remains effective because this binding cannot be neutralized.

To avoid misunderstanding this point, a clarification is necessary. By “binding,” no additional process within time is meant here. The point is not that something is held fast in time. Rather, what is meant is that with every occurrence, conditions are set that can no longer be fully undone. World does not occur without consequence. It leaves structural consequences. Time designates precisely this consequentiality.

Time is therefore not reduced to the past. It is not a mere residue of what has been. Precisely because occurrence cannot be undone, world is not reopened but newly set. No empty space of possibility emerges; instead, a shifted condition-structure arises in which further world-occurrence is possible only under the exclusion of the prior one. Future does not designate an open surface, but the continuation of world from a non-reversible shift of being. Time is not the openness of possibility, but the condition of its continued, non-reversible setting.

This shift of being is not to be understood as a mere change of state, but as a structural positing that necessarily entails loss. Every determination extinguishes possibilities; it excludes alternatives not only factually, but ontologically. The gap that emerges in this process is not an empty space, but the result of an exclusion: that which is no longer possible because world has fixed itself. Space, in this sense, does not arise as a neutral continuum, but as a response to this gap—as a folded, distorted form of a world that has lost its original openness. This distortion is not an optical deviation, but a structural deformation of relations: the breaking off of possible connections, the reduction of complexity, the loss of symmetrical reversibility. Precisely this deformation is the key to irreversibility. Time here does not designate the progression within this distorted world, but the non-reducibility of the distortion itself. It is the condition that prevents a once-positing world from being returned to its prior possibility. In this sense, time is neither medium nor space, but the irreversible consequence of the shift of being through which world acquires its form and thereby becomes non-resettable.

Time is therefore neither pure constriction nor mere openness. It is the tension between irreversible binding and further possibility. Openness is not a state prior to world, but a consequence of its history. Possibility does not exist independently of what has occurred, but in dependence upon it. Time is the structure in which world can continue to occur without losing its own past.

Against this background, it becomes intelligible why time can be measured without thereby becoming empty. Time can be compared without its differences being neutralized. It can be synchronized without history disappearing. Measurability, comparability, and synchronization concern formal quantities; they do not touch the ontological fact that world has taken place

under certain conditions and that these conditions co-determine the space of further possibilities.

Time is therefore not a container, but the irreversible condition-structure of world-binding. It does not designate a “more” of content, but the non-retractability of the posited world-structure. That time carries difference is not an additional effect, but the minimal prerequisite for world to have history and future at all.

This perspective does not shift the concept of time within physics, but beneath its formal presuppositions. It does not explain how time is measured, but why time appears at all as something that carries difference—and why this difference does not become empty, even when its display is reset.

6. Memory, Distortion, and the Fallacy of the Archive

From this perspective, it becomes intelligible why memory is necessarily distorted. If time is understood not as a neutral storage medium but as the trace of irreversible world-binding, the past can no longer exist as a reconstructable state. It is no longer present, but only effective. The past does not exist as a retrievable object, but as a deformed condition of the present.

Memory is therefore not a faulty copy of what has been. It is the correct effect of what can no longer be undone. It does not operate with stored states, but with a space of possibility structured by history. Memory does not actualize the past, but the present under altered conditions.

The brain therefore does not remember “poorly.” It remembers ontologically correctly. It does not store states, but responds to a world whose conditions have irreversibly shifted. Distortion is not a deficit, but a necessary consequence of the fact that world continues without shedding its history. Memory is always perspectival, not because it is subjective, but because world itself is continued perspectivally.

Artificial archives, by contrast, generate the illusion that the past is storable. They treat past states as if they could be isolated, preserved, and retrieved independently of further world development. In fact, archives store data, not world. They reconstruct states, not history. They replace lived irreversibility with formal repeatability.

This archival logic fails to recognize that the past does not lie behind the present like a closed space, but continues to operate within it as a condition of further possibility. Time cannot be archived. It can only be carried forward—not as content, but as altered possibility. Memory is precisely this carrying-forward: not access to what has been, but orientation within a world-context deformed by history.

In this sense, memory is not the opposite of the future, but its precondition. It does not hold world fast, but holds it open—though not arbitrarily, but under the conditions of what has occurred. Memory is the mode in which time reveals its double structure: as the trace of irreversible binding and as the enabling of further world-formation.

7. Delimitation: Supplement, Not an Attack

The present approach does not contradict relativity theory.
It supplements it on a different level.

Relativity theory explains:

- how time behaves relatively

The approach developed here explains:

- why time is not empty

Both are compatible—but not identical.

8. Conclusion – Time Differences Can Be Compared, History Cannot (Revised Version)

Time is not given after occurrence, but with the positing of world—as its non-retractability. Two clocks may stand next to each other again after their separation. Their displays may once again be the same. Their history is not. Time differences can be measured. History cannot be transferred.

This statement is not a physical thesis. It contradicts no calculation and no experiment. It is an ontological clarification. Relativity theory explains how time behaves relatively. It does not explain why time differences are not empty. This gap is not a deficiency of physics, but the point at which ontology becomes necessary.

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