



**VOL 0**

**WORLD-BINDING IN AN AGE  
OF STABILIZATION  
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES  
STUDIES IN WORLD-FORMATION**

**TIMOTHY SPEED**

**OPERATORIC RESEARCH CORPUS - STUDIES IN WORLD-FORMATION**

**Operatoric Research Corpus  
Studies in World-Formation**

Section 0

**Introduction**

Volume 0

**World-Binding in an Age of  
Stabilization**

**Introduction to the Series  
*Studies in World-Formation***

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# World-Binding in an Age of Stabilization

## *Introduction to the Series*

### *Studies in World-Formation*

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#### **Abstract:**

This introductory volume outlines the conceptual framework of the series *Studies in World-Formation*. The work begins from the observation that many contemporary systems—scientific, technological, economic, legal and administrative—operate with increasing efficiency and internal coherence, while simultaneously producing growing losses of relational world-capacity. The central distinction developed throughout the series is therefore not between progress and decline, but between world-binding and stabilization. Stabilization refers to the increasing tendency of modern systems to secure coherence, predictability and control through representation, simulation and formal procedures. While such mechanisms can maintain systemic order, they may also replace the relational processes through which worlds are actually formed, sustained and transformed.

The volume introduces the concept of an operatoric ontology, in which the primary question is not what entities exist, but which structural differences bind or block the emergence of worlds. Rather than treating objects as the fundamental units of reality, the approach focuses on relational processes, irreversible transitions and forms of emergence that cannot be fully captured within closed representational systems. Within this perspective, phenomena such as measurement in physics, morphological formation, artificial intelligence, economic value, legal responsibility and neurodivergent cognition can be understood as different arenas in which the tension between world-binding and stabilization becomes visible.

Methodologically, the work departs from additive models of knowledge production based primarily on cumulative citation. Instead, it develops a form of recursive, monotropic inquiry that investigates structural invariances across different domains. The operator functions here not as a formal rule applied to objects, but as a minimal difference structure through which world-binding becomes possible.

This introductory volume therefore provides both a methodological orientation and an architectural overview of the series. The subsequent volumes explore the same ontological distinction under varying structural conditions: in physics and cosmology as questions of measurement, collapse and ontological limits; in morphology and temporal theory as problems

of irreversible emergence and Eigenzeit; in artificial intelligence as the difference between functional correctness and world-capacity; in economics as the problem of value thresholds and the invisibility of world-sustaining work; in law and social institutions as the fragmentation of responsibility; and in neurodivergent epistemology as a heightened sensitivity to structural differences within highly stabilized systems.

Rather than presenting a closed theoretical system, the series investigates how different domains reveal the same structural tension between the formation of worlds and the stabilization of representations. Each volume therefore functions as a test field for a single guiding question: Does a given system bind world—or does it merely simulate it?

**Keywords:** operatoric ontology, world-binding, stabilization society, world-formation, simulation and reality, emergence and irreversibility, Eigenzeit, relational ontology, process philosophy, structural differences, ontology of emergence, measurement and collapse, morphology and form generation, artificial intelligence and simulation, economic value thresholds, social systems and responsibility, institutional stabilization, neurodivergent epistemology, monotropic research, provoked empiricism, philosophy of science, complexity and world-formation

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# Introduction

The present volume serves as the introductory frame to the series *Studies in World-Formation*. The contributions collected in the subsequent volumes investigate a shared problem that appears across a wide range of contemporary domains: the growing tension between the stabilization of systems and the conditions under which worlds are actually formed and sustained.

Modern societies have developed highly sophisticated mechanisms for stabilization. Scientific models, administrative procedures, economic indicators, technological infrastructures and legal frameworks provide coherence, predictability and control. These mechanisms are indispensable. At the same time, however, they tend to privilege representational consistency over relational processes through which new structures emerge. Systems can therefore function with increasing internal stability while simultaneously losing sensitivity to the conditions that make world-formation possible.

The work developed in this series approaches this tension through what is described as an operatoric ontology. Rather than beginning with objects as the fundamental units of analysis, it focuses on relational differences that bind or interrupt the emergence of worlds. Across different fields—physics, morphology, artificial intelligence, economics, law and neurodivergent epistemology—the same structural question appears in different forms: where do systems remain open to irreversible processes of emergence, and where do they close themselves through stabilization and simulation?

The following volumes do not constitute a unified theory in the traditional sense. Instead, they examine a recurring structural distinction under varying conditions. Each domain therefore becomes a test field for a common guiding question: whether a given configuration contributes to the binding of worlds, or whether it replaces this process with internally coherent but ultimately worldless forms of stabilization.

**Perhaps the most important insight of this series lies in recognizing the necessity for human beings to learn to shape the world in ways that produce world-binding – that is, responsibility toward existence itself and toward the shared condition of being part of a world we all inhabit.**

# Research Questions

The series is guided by a small number of structural research questions:

1. Under which conditions do systems bind world rather than merely stabilize representations?
2. Which structural differences allow irreversible processes of emergence to occur?
3. At what point does stabilization shift from necessary coordination to the closure of world-forming capacity?
4. How can epistemic practices remain sensitive to differences that stabilized systems tend to suppress?

These questions do not define a single disciplinary research program. They define a structural perspective through which different domains become comparable.

# Condensed Proposition

The central proposition of this work can be formulated succinctly:

Modern societies increasingly replace processes of world-formation with regimes of stabilization. Representation, simulation and procedural coherence produce systems that operate with high internal consistency while gradually losing the relational conditions under which worlds emerge and remain livable.

The task of an operatoric ontology is therefore not to describe objects more precisely, but to identify the structural differences that bind or block the formation of worlds.

Each volume of this series investigates a domain in which this difference becomes visible.

# 1. World-Binding in an Age of Stabilization Toward an Operatoric Ontology of a Simulation Epoch

We live in a time in which systems function in remarkable ways – and yet something essential is being lost. And what has been lost can no longer be grasped. The world closes itself through this loss in a new reduction, a formatting that has consequences because it permanently shifts everything that can be said, lived, and made possible within it.

What initially appears as a vast ecosystem is able to sustain less and less diversity, to integrate less and less deviation, and categories collapse into one another, mix, and can no longer be clearly assigned. Where everything has been simplified into objects, relations recede into the background. Where only facts and outputs are measured, downstream costs and indirect effects remain unnoticed. Powerlessness then is not the result of too much complexity, but of too much reduction, of the loss of resources, of alternative explanations, of other perspectives that remain livable.

When less and less remains possible, this forces further adaptation and thus distortion, twisting, and compression of life forms, life content, and representability.

Progress then is often no longer an expansion, but an accelerated shortening that can sustain, nourish, fulfill, and preserve fewer and fewer forms of life. Responsibility as a conscious relation erodes just as attentiveness toward others does. The state no longer asks how it can care for everyone, but only how it can format citizens as uniformly as possible.

The problem is pushed together: levels that must remain distinct in order to enable differentiation and awareness—such as work and life, existence and bureaucracy, economy and authentic value—are collapsed into one another until neither boundaries nor responsibilities remain recognizable. Politics becomes a staging of labeling and simulation.

Artificial intelligence generates coherent texts, forecasts, and models in such a distorted world, but without lived consequence. Administrations act within their competencies, document, examine, classify – and yet protective responsibility disintegrates into functional roles that no longer see a whole. Economies grow, indicators rise, efficiency increases – while social and ecological supporting structures erode at the same time. Legal systems secure procedures while existential injuries are managed as isolated cases.

These phenomena are not identical, but they follow a common logic. They do not arise from the moral failure of individuals, from corruption or incompetence, but from a structural shift. A shift in which stabilization takes precedence over world-binding.

This stabilization does not rebuild the world. It stabilizes broken and conflated categories into an order that is dysfunctional with regard to the world, yet appears highly rational, coherent, and internally closed.

By *stabilization society* I therefore refer to a social formation in which the securing of systemic coherence, predictability, and controllability becomes the dominant organizational principle, overshooting the goal of stabilization itself and ultimately ending in a blockage of world-capability.

It is as if the planet had shattered on the ground. People rush in, collect the fragments, glue them together, and say that this is the world.

Not in the sense of destruction, but in the sense of objectification.

The world is treated as something that can be disassembled, ordered, and reconstructed without including the relational conditions of its emergence.

What is preserved are the parts, but not the relations, not the *Eigenzeit*, not the becoming through which the world becomes world in the first place.

This autonomization of objecthood without relational capacity becomes visible wherever representation is taken as a sufficient substitute for reality. Models, files, indicators, simulations, and diagnoses take the place of irreversible world-acts. Systems are considered legitimate when they operate internally consistently, when their procedures are correctly followed, when their output indicators are correct. Whether they carry the world, whether they enable or block emergent processes, becomes secondary.

The paradox of this constellation is the following: the more stable the representational order becomes, the more invisible real losses of world-binding become.

In this sense, the stabilization society is not a moral accusation, but a structural diagnosis. It describes a form of collective self-organization in which complexity is systematically reduced in order to increase control – and in which precisely through this reduction emergent differences, *Eigenzeit*, and non-standardizable forms of world-formation are marginalized or pathologized.

The central distinction of this work therefore does not run along the line of technophobia or technological optimism, but along the difference between world and worldlessness. The world does not arise through description. The world arises through irreversible structural acts. Emergence is not merely an effect of complex calculation, but a transition that cannot be fully represented. *Eigenzeit* is not a subjective feeling, but the expression of this irreducible processuality in which something happens that cannot simply be reversed or simulated.

Simulation can reproduce structure. It can approximate dynamics. It can predict behavior. But it cannot found a world. It operates within closed parameters, whereas world-formation presupposes open spaces of difference.

This distinction runs through the following volumes in different fields: in physics as the question of measurement, collapse, and ontological boundary; in morphology as the problem of irreversible emergence and non-blueprint formation; in debates about artificial intelligence as the difference between functional correctness and world-capacity; in economics as the question of value thresholds and the invisibilization of world-sustaining work; in law as the

fragmentation of protective responsibility; in the welfare state as the simulation of care; and in the analysis of poverty as the ideological stabilization of deviation.

Neurodivergence appears in this context not as an identity marker, but as an epistemic access point. In highly stabilized systems, conformity becomes the condition for recognition. Masking becomes a survival strategy. Perceptual and cognitive forms that are not compatible are classified as deficits. Precisely where simulation becomes the social norm, pressure emerges to adapt to representational surfaces. Neurodivergent epistemic practices can – precisely through their structural non-fit – make differences visible that are leveled in stabilized orders.

The present work therefore understands itself as an operatoric ontology of an epoch in which stabilization has become the dominant response to uncertainty. It offers neither a simple counter-utopia nor a return to a supposedly authentic origin. Rather, it asks where stabilization tips over, where it shifts from necessary structure into closing reduction, and which criteria allow us to distinguish world-capacity from mere systemic coherence.

If we want to understand the present, we must grasp this distinction precisely. Not every order implies a loss of world. But every order that confuses its own closure with reality produces blind spots. And within these blind spots arise forms of violence, invisibility, and structural inoperability that cannot be addressed through better simulation, but only through renewed opening.

A stabilization society is therefore not defined by the fact that it stabilizes, but by the fact that it places stabilization above world-capacity.

If stabilization society describes a structural closure, then the question must be asked with which epistemic practice this closure can be made visible at all.

## **2. Toward a Methodology of Research Beyond Objects**

Before one can speak of an operatoric ontology, it must first be clarified what is meant by an operator. For an operator is not a thing. The term is used in different disciplines – in mathematics, in physics, in logic. There it usually refers to a function that acts on states and transforms them.

Here, however, an operator is not an abstract computational rule. Nor is it a pattern in the sense of an object-like structure, but something that is implied, like a logical consequence. Everything and nothing cannot exist simultaneously; rather, they imply one another. An operator is not an entity, but an implicit structure of difference. It is that which necessarily follows when the world cannot be closed without contradiction.

An operator can hold paradoxes in a way that not only preserves simultaneities but makes them necessary. In this sense, an operator is not an order, but that which is implied when the world cannot close itself.

These terms are not accidental here. They emerged from a specific epistemic practice. The ontology developed here did not arise from a neutral standpoint of observation, but from a mode of perception that does not primarily represent differences, but experiences them operatively. This epistemic shift is closely related to a neurodivergent practice of perception and cognition.

What in representational models is stabilized as an object appears here primarily as relation.

This shift – referred to here as a *shift of being* (Seinsverschiebung) – denotes the movement from the object toward relational field structures. It is not only theoretically motivated, but methodological. It is connected to a neurodivergent epistemic practice in which structure appears not as background but as the primary dimension of experience. It becomes more dominant than the thing, the object, as the building block of the world.

Where many forms of perception orient themselves toward stabilized surfaces – toward objects, roles, functions – this practice directs itself toward transitions, toward what occurs between categories. It is sensitive to ruptures, inconsistencies, and overlaps. It perceives not only what is present, but also what structurally does not fit – what would in fact be reduced in the face of real paradoxes.

In this sense, the operator is not a theoretical invention, but a conceptual articulation of this experiential mode. It implies, pre-ontologically, that minimal structure through which the world is bound without being reduced to objectivity. It is the consequence of existence close to gaps, incommensurabilities, or in dense relational configurations.

A structure becomes operatoric where it does not merely describe a space of possibilities, but produces irreversible consequences. Where it does not merely simulate, but decides, brings forth, and produces world.

In a stabilization society, operators are increasingly replaced by representations. Processes are converted into states, transitions into categories, relations into measurable values. What remains is coherence – but not world-formation.

An order is built as if there were no paradoxes, no subjective deviations, no vital affordances.

An operatoric ontology therefore does not primarily ask: What is the case?

Rather, it asks: Which difference binds the world here – and which is merely simulated?

Figuratively speaking, this concerns keeping open a door that exists within every thing, within every object. A mortality from which responsibility and binding must necessarily follow, so that the space of possibilities does not collapse. Research in the in-between seeks methodological approaches to a science beyond objects – a science capable of investigating contradictions, paradoxes, and gaps in their conditions without distorting them through formatting.

One might understand this as a second Enlightenment: one that this time does not defend the thing against magic, but relation against an increasingly simulated certainty of measured objecthood.

## 2.1 The Internal Logic of this Research

This work does not follow the usual model of academic production. It did not emerge from the incremental extension of existing literature, but from a long-term, monotropic engagement with structural problems. Monotropic here does not mean one-sidedness, but intensity: a problem space is held over many years, not in order to close it, but to reveal recurring invariances – structures that appear across different fields without having to be stabilized through external reference.

The model developed here is therefore not the result of additive citation, but of an operatoric condensation. Knowledge does not arise primarily through linear accumulation, but through repeated confrontation with structural ruptures, paradoxes, and boundary phenomena. The operator does not appear as a theoretical thesis, but as a structural necessity that repeatedly asserts itself in different contexts.

This shift also affects the subject–object schema. Research does not appear here as the discovery of an already finished object, but as the expression of an implicit structure of difference that simultaneously shapes researcher and world. In this sense, the operator is not a tool of the subject, but the condition under which both subject and object emerge.

Classical science strives for convergence, for unambiguity, for the reduction of deviation. This research follows a different movement: it multiplies differences in order to expand the space of possibilities itself. The aim is not to definitively explain the thing. Rather, the space within which things emerge is to remain open.

This openness, however, is not an aesthetic program but an empirical strategy. By refusing to close a problem space prematurely, forms of data emerge that remain invisible within stabilized models. Structural reactions, institutional shifts, and implicit paradoxes only become visible where the system is allowed to continue operating according to its own logic without being immediately forced into a category.

In this sense, the research produces a form of provoked empiricism: by persistently keeping structural differences open, insights arise that would not be accessible through purely observational or exclusively modeling approaches. The analysis of real institutional conflict processes, legal disputes, or administrative blockages is therefore not a peripheral phenomenon of this work but an expression of this method. It produces not less data, but different data – data about structure, reaction, and the boundary behavior of systems.

The refusal of permanent reassurance through external citation is therefore not a withdrawal from the scientific sphere, but a consequence of this mode of emergence. The aim is not to deliver a final representation of the world, but to uncover those conditions under which the world is bound or blocked.

This is not a rejection of science.

It is a shift of its focus.

### 3. The Architecture of this Work

The methodology developed here does not remain confined to a single field. It does not produce an isolated theory, but a structural perspective that reappears across different domains.

Physics, morphology, artificial intelligence, economics, law, the welfare state, neurodivergence – within the academic landscape these fields appear as separate disciplines. Within the perspective developed here, however, they are expressions of the same difference: the tension between world-formation and stabilization.

What appears in physics as the problem of measurement and collapse appears in debates on artificial intelligence as the confusion of functional correctness with world-capacity. What operates in economics as a value threshold appears in law as the fragmentation of protective responsibility. What emerges in the welfare state as administrative logic appears in neurodivergent life as pressure toward adaptation and masking.

These fields are not connected additively. They are connected operatorically. This means that the same structure of difference operates within each of them – only under different conditions.

The architecture of this work therefore does not follow a disciplinary order, but a structural one. Each volume investigates a field in which the boundary between simulation and world-formation becomes visible. Each volume is a passage through the same ontological difference, but under altered parameters.

The physics volumes ask about the ontological condition of world-formation itself.

The morphology volumes investigate irreversible emergence and form.

The AI and simulation volumes analyze closed parameter orders.

The economic volumes address value thresholds and stabilization through reduction.

The legal volumes examine representational power and structural incompatibility.

The neurodivergence-related volumes reflect the epistemic sensitivity to these differences.

What emerges is therefore not an encyclopedic system, but a repeated confrontation with the same structure under changing conditions.

The operator does not function here as a unifying theoretical formula, but as a structural minimum: as that implicit difference which decides whether a system binds world – or merely simulates it.

## 4. The Structure of the Volumes: The Unfolding of a Difference

The following volumes are not a collection of thematic studies. They constitute a structured unfolding of the same ontological difference under different conditions. Each volume examines a field in which it is decided whether the world is bound – or replaced by stabilization.

The physics volumes form the ontological foundation. They do not primarily ask about theories of individual phenomena, but about the very condition of world-formation: What does measurement mean? What is collapse? What is irreversibility? Where does the boundary lie between mathematical description and ontological decision? It is here that the difference between simulation and world first becomes fundamentally visible.

The morphological and time-related works shift this question into the domain of irreversible emergence. Form does not arise as the execution of a blueprint, but as a bound difference within an open field. Time does not appear as a neutral continuum, but as *Eigenzeit* – as the condition of irreversible structural acts. Here it becomes clear that the world does not emerge from stable objects, but from processes that cannot be fully reduced or reversed.

The volumes on artificial intelligence and simulation investigate those systems in which stabilization reaches its most technologically advanced form. Here the confusion of functional correctness with world-capacity becomes particularly visible. A system can operate coherently without binding the world. The limit of simulation is not revealed by its performance, but by its ontological closure.

The economic works analyze stabilization as a value threshold. Measurability replaces relation, efficiency replaces sustainability, and labor becomes invisible precisely where it sustains the world but cannot be quantified. The question of value shifts from output to binding: What sustains the world? What reduces it?

The legal and welfare-state volumes examine stabilization as a regime of representation. Jurisdiction fragments responsibility. Procedures secure formal correctness while spaces of protection erode. Here it becomes visible how the simulation of justice can produce real inoperability. Structural incompatibility is administered rather than resolved.

The neurodivergence-related works finally reflect the epistemic dimension of this difference. In highly stabilized systems, conformity becomes the condition of recognition. Masking appears as adaptation to representational surfaces. At the same time, a sensitivity becomes visible for ruptures, transitions, and implicit differences that remain invisible within stabilized orders.

These fields are not connected additively. They are passages through the same operator. In each domain it becomes visible how stabilization can replace world-capacity – and where possibilities for renewed opening nevertheless emerge.

The architecture of this work is therefore neither encyclopedic nor disciplinary. It is structural. Each volume is a test case for the same question:

Does this system bind world – or does it merely simulate it?

## Criteria of World-Capability

Within the perspective developed here, a system can be described as world-capable when it fulfills several structural conditions:

- **Relational openness** – the system remains responsive to differences that cannot be fully represented in advance.
- **Irreversible processes** – the system allows structural transitions that cannot be reduced to reversible state changes.
- **Eigenzeit** – processes unfold according to internal temporalities rather than exclusively external scheduling or parameterization.
- **Responsibility of consequence** – actions generate consequences that remain relationally bound rather than being absorbed into purely procedural closure.

Where these conditions disappear, stabilization may still produce coherence, but the capacity to bind world diminishes.

The purpose of this introductory volume is therefore not to resolve the tensions described here, but to render them visible.

The following volumes explore these tensions in different domains, asking in each case whether a system contributes to the binding of worlds – or replaces it with stabilized simulation.

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